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There is growing realisation world wide that the attainment of environmental sustainability is
contingent upon reinstatement of community authority over management of natural resources. In
acknowledgement of this imperative the government of Mozambique has formulated policies and
enacted legislation to promote Community-Based Natural Resource Management.
The research reported here considers the prospects for achieving CBNRM in a fishery located in a
remote part ofthe country on the border between Mozambique and Tanzania. The central hypothesis
addressed is that the fishery in historical terms was operated under a common property regime and
that , under a number of forces , this has changed to an open access regime. The challenge facing
government is to return the fishery to a common property regime.
A conceptual framework which illustrates transformation ofthe fishery was developed. This was used
to structure the research. Central question posed includes:
what evidence is there that the fishery may have operated as common property system?
what evidence is there that it now operates as an open access system?
• what forces promoted such change, if indeed change has occurred?
The findings are that the fishery has changed and now has the characteristics of the prospects for a
return to CBNRM. Three issues are considered:
who is the community?
• what are the resources? and
what are the management issues?
It is concluded that definition ofthe 'community' is difficult because ofhistorical precedents ofaccess
and use. The resource is shown to be complex including fish, water, land and plants; it also varies in
tenure and space. Quite different rights of tenure issues accompany different resources. And
management is complicated by international issues and apparent weaknesses in organisational
structures, legislation and resources (human and financial). Evidence indicates that the people
involved in the fishery are concerned about the state of the fishery and the lack of controls. They
express a need for CBNRM.
This study exposes the very complex nature ofthe fishery and suggests that failure to appreciate and
understand this complexity encourages simplistic approaches to introduction ofCBNRM. These are
likely to fail. It is recommended that in light of the complexity elucidated by this research, the
government should engage a strategic planning process with the intention of designing and
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CHAPTER]
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and rationale
Fisheries are an important activity in terms of subsistence food production in many parts of Africa,
and are a primary and cheap source ofdietary animal protein, although this can also be obtained from
domestic or wild meat. Fishing is also an important economic activity, both because fish is in demand
being a traditional staple.relish ofthe riverside or flood plain people (Nkhata and Kalumiana, 1997),
and as such can become an important source of income (Timberlake, 1997).
On the Lucheringo-Rovuma-Messinge River systems, Sanga District, Northern Niassa Province,
Mozambique, (Figure 1.1), in the area bordering Tanzania, small-scale fishing and related activities
for home consumption are carried out by men, women and children (ruCN in prep .). Fishing
potentially represents a significant source ofsubsistence food , animal protein and cash income in most
of this area . However, both (he subsistence and commercial value ofthe fisheries currently appear to
be well below its potential (ruCN in prep.).
There are indications of overexploitation of the fish resource (ruCN in prep.). For example, sites
which had particularly abundant fish species in the past, now have hardly any trace ofthese fish. There
is belief of general breakdown ofthe customary management system (ruCN in prep .) which has led
to open access. This is associated with little respect for nursery areas and other trad itional taboos;
the use of small mesh size nets ; the migration of fishermen who used to fish only in defined areas ;
undersized fish on the market; upward trend offish prices ; widespread use offish poisons (both from
plants and chemicals); and increasing diversification to other activities such as hunting for both food
and cash. Many of these activities are also illegal according to the government fisheries regulations
(National Directorate of Fisheries, Fisheries Policy and the Legal framework, i.e. Fisheries Act
(1990). Essentially the fisheries situation in the area appears to be a case of "open access" with no
common property regime or government control process in place resulting in overexploitation ofthe
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resource (Shackleton and Tapson, 1998).
The system of transforming open access (use of a commons without controls) to common property
management (management ofa resource as a common property) is ofparticular interest. Research from
a number of countries has demonstrated the effectiveness of common property regime for natural
resource management under well-defined circumstances(Bromley and Cernea, 1989). Institutions for
Common Property Resource Management (CPRM) have persisted to a greater or lesser extent in many
areas (Barker, 1997), with classic examples of enduring systems including communal pastures and
irrigation management functioning in the Swiss Alps (Netting, 1981), communal forest in Japan
(Mckean, 1986), China (Menzies, 1994) and Nepal (Ghimire, 1993), and marine tenure in coastal
fisheries (Berkes, 1987).
Other studies refer to the successful implementation ofnew systems ofmanagement ofcommons, "land
or another resource used simultaneously or serially by the members of a community (Bruce, 1993)"
and reversal ofopen access regimes, e.g. the Senegal Livestock Development Project and the Middle
Atlas Central Area Agricultural Development Project in Morocco (Bromley & Cernea, 1989),
Wildlife Conservation in Namibia (Jones, 1997; MET, 1998), and CAMPFIRE Programme in
Zimbabwe (King, 1993). Thus, despite the likelihood of open access fishery, considerable potential
exists in Northern Sanga, Mozambique, for establishing management of fisheries resources under
common property regime.
1.2 Aims and objectives
The remoteness of the study area (Chapter 3) and the short period since cessation of civil war are
contributing factors in the low levels understanding of the fishery weak foundation on which to
promote government policy of CBNRM. This study provides a 'first level' of information and
understanding. It sets out to determine whether the fishery has changed from a common property
resource management to open access and, ifso, to understand the context in which this has occurred.
This understanding would then be used to support formulation of a strategy for introduction of
CBNRM.
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Goal: The goal in accordance with government policy is to have the artisanal fishery (a fishery that
involves local skills) under effective community-based management which promotes sustainable use
of the resource.
Objectives of the study:
1. Understand CBNRM particularly in the context of artisanal fishery;
2. Understand the changes and the causal factors;
3. Understand current policies, structures, strategies and processes for promoting sustainable
artisanal fisheries;
4. Assess the capacity ofgovernment to facilitate improved community based fisheries resource
management;































COMMUNITY BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (CBNRM)
2.1 The problem
In the African continent, a growing concern outside protected areas is the continuing deterioration of
the environment and the escalating levels ofpoverty in rural areas (Kiss, 1990). The natural resource
base makes an important contribution to the economy of rural households and the increase in
population pressure has resulted in a simultaneous expansion of natural resource exploitation
commonly to levels which cannot be sustained (Kiss, 1990).
These communities cannot, however, afford to discontinue exploitative resource use pract ices in the
interests of ecological conservation alone. Infield (1986), in a case study in KwaZulu-Natal, found
that while more respondents from a rural community strongly supported the conservation ofwildlife
than those who rejected it, the economic constraints on them were too influential and wildlife and
natural resources are destroyed out of the necessity for survival. He found that affluence strongly
influenced attitudes about conservation, even where people may support the concept. Therefore, he
concluded that only by the creation of rural wealth can the pressure on the natural resource base be
reduced.
However, global economic trends and Structural Adjustment Programmes are further underminingthe
already existing capacities and resources ofgovernm~ntsto ensure the effective management of state
owned resources (Rihoy, 1998). This, coupled with demands brought about through increased
democratization, particularly in southern Africa, has strengthened the trend towards decentralization
of authority. Today, most governments are exploring options for development of eo-management
arrangements with communal area dwellers (Rihoy, 1998). The government of Botswana's Tribal
Land Boards, for example, are recognized by many as one of the most successful experiences with
decentralization ofland administration and democratization of the process at the local level (Rihoy,
1998).
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The wildlife sector is one that has been experimenting with decentralization of authority over
resources through programmes such as LIFE in Namibia, CANlPFIRE in Zimbabwe and ADMADE
in Zambia (Rihoy, 1998) . These and similar initiatives in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and
Tanzania, commonly known as Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM), seek to
provide the legal, institutional and economic frameworks for communities to become eo-managers of
communal area resources (Rihoy, 1998). According to Rihoy (1998), this approach is showing
positive results .
2.2 Community Based Natural Resource Management
The concept community-based natural resource management, according to Little (1994), entails any
of the following characteristics: local level, voluntary, people-centered, participatory, decentralized
or village level. Little considers that CBNRM should embody conservation in the area as one of its
outcomes and it should be associated with some material benefit on the part ofthe local communities.
"Cases where local communities (in low income areas) manage their resource bases with the prime
objective ofconservation, rather the improved social arid economic welfare are virtually non-existent"
(Little , 1994).
Governments have increasingly become aware that centralized administration will not be able to carry
out the task ofmanaging fish resources single handedly because they are usually under staffed and lack
infrastructure and financial means (Robert, pers. comm.1999). Eventually, government has turned to
local communities for their support. It has been noted that community involvement in common-pool
resources management will help cut down on financial demands by government, as the local
communities will share responsibilities and benefits (Kothari, 1997) . With autonomy conferred on the
local communities they should be able, in theory, to define their own preferences, and they would
develop at their own pace and in their own way. They would learn their lessons and structure, their
own skills in the maintenance of resources (e.g. fish) as a common property (Western et al. 1994).
Klemeyer (1994) notes that cultural forms and traditions can be put to certain uses that are vital in
fulfilling the difficult duty ofbringing about enormous change in human sensitivity in respect to fish
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resource conservation as a common pool resource.
Unfortunately, forces beyond control oflocal communities have weakened the culture thatformed the
basis of fisheries management generally. A shift from "top-down" approaches to community-based
resource management will afford local communities opportunities to re-build their lost identities,
restore their pride in their own innovative capacities, and protect their cultural uniqueness, if they
wish to do so (Kothari, 1997).
Kothari (1997) observe that all over the world, people are demanding a greater voice in decision
making and have aspirations to re-establish some control over and right to the resources which sustain
their livelihoods . This process, the move towards CBNRM, can therefore be viewed as a matter of
primary human right and social justice for local communities, including those in northern
Mozambique.
Definition of CBNRM
Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) is a management strategy that has
developed in response to the apparent inadequacies in past conservation and development practice
(Maughan-Brown, 1998). It recognizes that rural communities have an important role to play in
managing wildlife and natural resources, and that resource management can potentially be an
instrument ofrural development, once communities recognize the economic value ofthe resource (Le
Quesne, 1996). CBNRM is a strategy thatwas designed to make conservation sustainable by reducing
conflict between the managers of adjoining natural resources and local communities ; to make
management more effective by drawing on local expertise; and to contribute to processes of
sustainable socio-economic development (Bell, 1987). CBNRM has developed as a strategy in light
ofAfrica 's development crisis, the apparent failure ofdevelopment in Africa. A perception exists that
CBNRM is able to address social development needs and economic development needs in a
sustainable way.
'Community' is a term that is used in many contexts and with different connotations. It is important to
clarify before further discussion. Typically the word is used to indicate that a group of people, or
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section of the population have something in common, as in "a community of interests" . This
commonality may be as simple as a physical boundary or geographic area. However there are other
important characteristics such as age, race , ethnicity, gender, culture or religion that serve to define
a community. A community usually has a psycho-social component. This includes a community
sentiment or shared communal values, convictions and goals and there is usually a shared reason for
being or acting together (i.e . a perceived community benefit) (Hawtin, et at. 1994; Kotze and
Swanepoel, 1983; Hamilton, 1992).
CBNRM in the context of this research is defined as local community empowerment through a
participatory approach to manage fisheries resources.
The key principles of CBNRM and environmental management
According to Steiner and Rihoy (1995), the key principles underlying CBNRM are still being refined
as CBNRM programmes evolve. Attempts have, however, been made to capture the experiences and
lessons learnt in CBNRM in southern Africa. This experience has led to the elaboration of five key
principles, widely acknowledged as capturing the optimum conditions for resource management under
communal property regimes (Steiner and Rihoy, 1995) . According to (Murphree, 1993 in Steiner and
Rihoy, 1995), these five principles are.
1. Effective management of natural resources is best achieved by giving the resource a
focused value - to determine whether the benefit ofmanaging a resource exceeds the cost the
resource must have as a measurable value to the community.
2. Differential inputs must result in differential benefits - those communities living with the
resource and thus bearing a higher cost should receive higher benefits than those who do not
bear this cost.
3. There must be a positive correlation between the quality of management and the
magnitude of derived benefits - an incentive for good management must reward greater
investment in the resource with greater benefits.
4. The unit ofproprietorship (i.e, who decides) should be the same as the unit of production,
management and benefit - the group which manages the resource should also form the local
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management institution.
5. The unit ofproprietorship should be as small as practicable, within ecological and socio-
political constraints - smaller social groups are better at managing themselves and the
resource than large anonymous institutions .
CBNRM is one type of institutional mechanism that involves the community in natural resource
management and occurs at community level. Importantly, it also occurs withina much broader political
and institutional environment in which the environment and natural resources are managed, and
development occurs. It is therefore necessary to have an understanding of the broader political
institutional environment inwhich CBNRM occurs. The World Resources Institute has identifiedwhat
it considers to be the key principles related to this broader environment. These principles were
identified in an analysis of the environmental management strategies of African countries (Dorm-
Adzobu, 1995). These principles can be extrapolated to also reflect the broader principles needed for
an enabling environment for development in terms of CBNRM and include the following:
1. Institutional choice:A key role that environmental (and development) strategies are expected
to play is to establish a precedent and continuing basis for effective cross-sectoral co-
ordination in managing the environment. This entails finding an effective lead institution and
preventing inter-institutional conflicts. Specific recommendations include: national policies
for the environment (which are cross-sectoral in nature) should be co-ordinated at a level
higher than that of line of ministries; the institutional structure must allow for effective co-
ordination outside of government, especially with the private sector and civil society.
2. Political support: Political support is the most important prerequisite in the quest for
sustainable development. Government commitment to strategic planning, comprehension of
issues at stake, allocation of resources for institutional development, and the general
involvement of the political leadership all determine success of the planning exercise. Every
effort must thus be made to ensure support at the highest level, not only for the planning
exercise, but for the whole notion of environmental management. That support must also be
truly cross-sectoral and come from government, the private sector, and civil society.
3. Local and su b-national participation: It isimportantto effectivelyinclude NGOs, indigenous
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institutions, and concerned individuals in the planning process. Major considerations include
decentralization policies, 'national ownership' of the planning process, NGO participation,
and planning and implementation instruments. Aneffective strategic plan for the environment
should include commitments to strengthening the role of 'sub-national' government
organizations and increasing their responsibility and should call for constant interaction with
community and other stakeholder groups. NGOs often play a useful, even essential role in
facilitating such participation.
4. Donor support: Animportant element in most planning exercises is the role ofdonors, which
includes the provision of technical assistance, the co-ordination of activities, and the
imposition of conditionalities. Donors must take pains to ensure that their role helps to
strengthen the country's (and its institutions) sense of ownership of the strategic planning
process and elevate the importance of environmental management (CBNRM in this case) in
general.
5. Capacity development: Obviously, a determinant of any national environmental (CBNRM
in this case) strategy's ultimate success is the relative capacity ofthe institutions and structures
that sustain it. The strategic planning process needs to strengthen the capacities of these
institutions and the individuals who staff them through training and other activities.
6. Implementation: There is a need for strategic plans that are implemented. To help ensure that
this happens, an implementation agenda must be designed as part ofthe planning process. The
key elements ofsuch an agenda are ensuring that a central co-ordination institution is in place;
facilitating that institutions attempt to build bridges with other organizations; conducting
training needs assessment; adopting innovative approaches in the use of policy instruments;
monitoring the performance of the planning and implementation process; and developing
public awareness and education programmes.
Implementation of CBNRM
In southern Africa, known examples of CBNRM include the Luangwa Integrated Resource
Development Project (LIRDP), Administrative ManagementDesign (ADMADE) both ofZambia, and
Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) .
The links which have developed between Mozambique and Zimbabwe in promotion ofCBNRM have
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focused attention on the CAMPFIRE approach. CAMPFIRE entails efforts by the government of
Zimbabwe to:
seek the free-will participation of communities in a strategy that embodies long-term
resolutions to maintenance of natural resources;
facilitate group ownership with specified rights ofaccess to common property resources; and
promote formulation oflocallevel structures to manage the common-property resources for
the benefit ofthe communities themselves and the environment (Madzudzu, 1996;Panos, 1997,
cited in Kumchedwa, 1998).
CAMPFIRE has succeeded, in:
Reviving the understanding among local communities ofthe interdependence between natural
resources and local communities themselves;
Eradicating or curbing poaching of wildlife;
Facilitating local level natural resource institutions;
Rejuvenating conservation of common property resources; and
Improving socio-economic status at both household and village levels (Murphree 1994).
CAMPFIRE has faced some limitations such as:
Failure of council members to devolve real responsibility and power to more local
communities to manage their own wildlife resources;
Corruption through embezzlement of funds (lIED, 1994).
Notwithstanding its failures, CAMPFIRE "is becoming a test bed for people-centered
conservation..."(Panos, 1997). It offers a number oflessons for the southern Africa region.
CAMPFIRE has demonstrated that local communities who are daily in touch with, for example, the
fish resource are the best custodians ofthe resource (Panos, 1997). "There is a tradition among these
and many other indigenous groups, of stewardship ofthe land and its natural resources for survival
and responsibility to the younger generations" (Klemeyer, 1994).
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Hara (1996) citing Ostrom (1990) warns of"blueprints" in community-based conservation in which
policy makers and donors alike prescribe to the local communities what is to be done in a particular
situation. Metcalfe (l994)highlights that CAMPFIRE avoided using the technique of"blueprint" in
its implementation. He gives an example ofone ward where 80% ofthe revenue collected from safari
contracts was given to the communities without specifying the use of the money . Voluntarily, the
concerned villages expressed their choice for some ofthe money to acquire a grinding mill, clinic and
schools while keeping a portion as household income. "The village became involved in its own land-
use planning and the people built wildlife into range management plans (Metcalfe, 1994). This calls
for "empowering people to mobilize their own capacities, ... make decisions and control activities
that affect their lives" (Cernea, 1985 cited in lIED, 1994) .
CAMPFIRE demonstrates how to address the issue of rights of exclusion and inclusion among the
local communities. Metcalfe (1994) observes that non-members, or those who did not register, did
not benefit from the collections from CAMPFIRE which means that members have the right to exclude
those outside, and in turn non-members have a duty to abide by the ruling. This, as will be seen, is an
important condition for fish resources to be sustained as common property (Emmerson, 1980;
Schlager, 1990; Cousins, 1992) . Each community should identify as a unit ofproduction and this unit
must be holding the proprietorship, responsibility for management and benefits and decision making
(Murphree, 1993 cited in Metcalfe, 1994; Madzudzu, 1996) . CBNRM will not succeed in the local
villages so long as management boundaries in regard to rights to access to resources as common
property remain obscured (Metcalfe, 1994). The government should officiallygrant community-based
rights and demarcate the spatial boundaries ofthe existing systems (Lynch and Alcorn , 1994). "When
existing systems are rooted in the local ecology and already possess legitimacy in the minds oflocal
people, recognition facilities are more environmentally and culturally appropriate for evolution and
development" (Lynch and Alcorn , 1994).
CAMPFIRE has also demonstrated that production units should be identified in the local villages.
These production units have to be small enough, encompassingahomogeneous community(Madzudzu,
1996), in order to maintain resources within limits as set up by the social, economic, political and
ecological constraints (Murphree, 1993 in Metcalfe, 1994) . "A communal resource management is
13
enhanced if it is small enough for all members to meet face to face, to enforce conformity with rules
through peer pressure, and to create a long-standing identity"(Metcalfe, 1994) . This issue of
membership and of meeting face to face has particular relevance in a fishery situated on the border
of the two countries (Mozambique and Tanzania) as will be shown later.
Ifthe problem ofover-fishing as a result ofuncontrolled fishing, in essence treating the fish as an open
resource, is to be addressed CAMPFIRE experience has shown that the local communities have to
formulate rules, monitor and enforce them effectively (Metcalfe, 1994), i.e. return the resource to
common property from open access. Appropriators who violate operation rules should be brought to
book by other appropriators (Hara, 1996) and, if necessary, by the government.
Management of the process of natural resource management is central to a CBNRM programme
(Maughan-Brown, 1998). The underlying rationale for CBNRM isthat through the sound management
of resources and the effective utilization of these resources, development can be facilitated. By
adopting a more socially responsive approach to conservation it is argued that conservation will be
more sustainable in the long term. The need for sound management and environment sustainability is
made all the more pertinent by the fact that conservation is being used as a vehicle for development
(Maughan-Brown, 1998). The long term viability of development based on natural resources is,
therefore, dependent on the sustainable use ofthese resources. Natural resources should be managed
to promote the maximum sustainable development to the community. The management of natural
resources should facilitate Murphree's third principle of CBNRM - that there must be a positive
correlation between the quality ofmanagement and the magnitude ofderived benefits. The long term
sustainability depends, amongst other things, on the sustainable use of environmental resource
(Goodland, 1995).
As mentioned earlier, the CBNRM programme initiative in most African countries, in many respects,
is showing positive results. However, whilst these programmes advocate strong 'ownership rights'
for communities, they have been relying upon state permission to experiment rather than a mandate
for decentralization and tenurial security. Some observers consider that South Africa, and to some
degree Namibia, are currently in the process of taking the 'next step' in the approach through the
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development of a policy and legislative framework that devolves full tenurial rights to communities
(Rihoy, 1998).
The idea ofcommunity involvement is linked to Murphree' s fourth principle ofCBNRM - the idea that
the unit of the proprietorship should be the same as the unit of production (Murphree, 1993). It is
argued by Bak (1995) and O'Donoghue (1993) that the knowledge and participation of local
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communities in resource management is essential, because oftheir extensive knowledge oftheir own
environment (Bak, 1995, O'Donoghue,1993, Breen et al. 1998). Under the right circumstances,
communities can potentially be effective institutions for resource management (Murphree, 1993) .
It has been noted that in many instances CBNRM will, during its initial stages of formulation and
implementation, be heavily oriented towards a 'top-down' approach (Murphree, 1993). This will
occur when communities do not have the capacity, expertise or the resources to initiate such
programmes themselves.External interventions are commonly necessary to initiate CBNRM strategies.
However, if CBNRM is to become sustainable in the long term, relatively independent of external
interventions, it is critical that the programme moves towards an orientation that is 'bottom-up'.
Increasingly confidence is being placed in participatory community-based development processes as
a way of addressing environmental issues from so-called 'bottom up' perspective (Taylor, 1998). A
development intervention will have most chance of success if there is meaningful and lasting human
development that builds capacity and empowerment, thus allowing CBNRM to become selfsustaining
'community-based'. For this to happen, development must be a learning process, and there must be
extensive and meaningful participation of the people implementing and affected by the planning and
management ofthe programme (Swanepoel, 1989). Murphree (1993) believes that "the management
ofcommunal property resources can act as a powerful catalyst for communal institution development" .
To make development a learning process, people must be guided, given skills and encouraged to take
the initiative (Swanepoe1, 1989). Individuals can learn through their engagement with the process of
planning and managing a programme but, where necessary, formal adult education is also effective in
empowering individuals and developing human resources (Hamilton, 1992).
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The success of CBNRM programmes in Africa will depend on the extent to which management and
conservation strategies can come to reflect a broader community of people (Taylor, 1998). Taylor
emphasizes this point and states that "this reorientation to wider public participation, sometimes
called community-based development, is crucially important if the legacy ofauthoritarian, top down
colonial practices are to be successfully overturned" .
It is therefore critical that a CBNRN programme intervention shows an evolving level ofparticipation
by the community and external agents. At initiation ofa project external involvement will predominate,
with limited community participation. However, as the programme develops there should be
increasing community capacity, that is promoted by strategies to develop human capacity during the
programme intervention. Ideally a point should be reached in the programme life at which community
involvement supercedes external involvement. If this point is achieved , it will mark part of a
successful evolution from a ' CBNRM programme intervention' to a more autonomous 'CBNRM
programme' .
2.3 Tenure and CBNRM
A system of tenure has been defined as " ...simply a bundle of rights, ... rights to use land, trees and
their products in certain ways and sometimes to exclude others" (Bruce and Fortmann, 1989). The
system basically defines the rights and obligations of an individual or group regarding certain
resources governed by the tenurial system. Three distinct tenure regimes, or property rights systems,
have been distinguished as follows "freehold", "leasehold" and "communal" tenure. Tenure systems
are not necessarily mutually exclusive and sometimes coexist within the same production system. It
is not at all unusual for a village to have a certain tenure over an area , while an individual or family
has tenure over part ofthe same land" (Bruce and Fortmann, 1989) . In fisheries for example, fish may
be common property (communal tenure) where individuals may have exclusive rights (household or
freehold tenure) to fish a particular area either continuously or intermittently. A fourth tenure regime,
or rather the absence ofany clear system ofrights and obligations, open access , can also be identified
as a distinctive tenure system.
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Private property refers to the individual's right to exclude others from a resource or resources.
Common property refers to the individual's right not to be excluded from the group's resources. State
property refers to the right of the state to exclude individuals or groups of individuals from some
resource or resources (Murombedzi, 1990).
Common property regime is thus based on some concept of equitable access to a resource by all
members of a clearly defined group. Group membership is strictly defined either in lineage or
residence terms or by some other criteria that is understood and accepted by all group members.
Communal tenure thus defines a common property regime (Murombedzi, 1990).
Communal tenure, indeed all tenure regimes, are dynamic institutions that are always changing more
in response to external circumstances than to any internal dynamics within the system itself. It has
been demonstrated for instance that the communal land tenure system existing in Zimbabwe today is
more an artifact of colonial interventions than the result of internal dynamics within that system
(Cheater, 1989). It is also evident that the tenure systems pertaining to most resources in Zimbabwe
were potentially determined to protect the interest ofcertain groups while at the same time depriving
others ofaccess to those resources. The research reported here focused primarily on the tenure system
regarding natural resources, more specifically fisheries, on the Lucheringo-Rovuma-Missinge river
systems northern Niassa, Mozambique.
Communal tenure has been indicated for inevitably leading to resource degradation because of its
inability to control the behaviour of individuals within that group regarding the utilization of the
group's common resources. The chiefarchitect ofthis position was Hardin (1968), who advanced the
"Tragedy of the Commons" paradigm whose basic premise is that individuals will attempt to
maximize their benefits from common properties at the expense ofthe resources themselves and the
group as a whole. The main critics of this position point out that it really defines an open access
regime rather than common property. These critics (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975; Lawry, 1989;
Ostrom, 1987) note that any common property regime by implication refers to the existence of some
institutional arrangement to regulate both access to the commons and the rights and obligations of
individuals within the group regarding the commons. It is also pointed out that due to the introduction
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of foreign norms regarding the utilization of these resources (e.g. hunting, colonisation), such
institutional arrangements have everywhere atrophied through a process of disuse (Lawry, 1989;
Marks, 1984; Berry, 1989; Scoones and Wilson, 1989).
The response oflocal people to the expropriation ofhitherto common properties has inevitably been
to exploit these on individual basis. In other words the substitution of state property for common
property has at the same time introduced the rationality, albeit without the legitimacy, ofopen access
to local communities. In the case of wildlife, exploitation has tended to take the form of "stealing"
the resource from the state by individuals whenever they can (Murphree, 1990), as is thought to be the
case offisheries in the Lucheringo-Rovuma-Missinge river systems, in northern Niassa, Mozambique,
by outsiders. One can also speculate that a class ofindividuals specializing in poaching, has come into
existence and that these engage in various forms ofexchange with other members ofthe group who do
not have similar inclination or access, or who for various other reasons cannot or will not engage in
poaching.
Local responses to new definitions ofcommon property have varied from attempts on the part ofthe
rich peasantry to expropriate and privatize the commons, thus beginning a process ofproletarianisation
that is distinguished by several factors, (Cheater, 1989; Murombedzi, 1990; Breen et a1.1998) to
attempts on the part ofa section of the peasantry to expropriate private land through "squatting" or
"illegal settlement".
At the same time, a process of differentiation is occurring among the peasantry. This process dates
back to colonial and pre-colonial times but has obviously been accelerated by independence and the
introduction of increased access to markets, credit facilities and cash income remittances for some
peasant households (Scoones and Wilson, 1989; Cousins, 1992) and also information and technology
(Breen et al. 1998) . Such differentiation inevitably results in a redefining of individuals'
relationships with common properties.
All these processes thus point to the need to redefine individual and group rights to common properties
if the current trend of degradation and decimation is to be halted and reversed. The search for
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solutions should be based upon the recognition that viewed in proper perspective, the problem of
resource degradation is in essence, the problem of the unnatural ' death' of common property
management institutions.To emphasize this point Murombedzi (1990) traces the historical origins and
functions of common property institutions and how they served to regulate sustainable utilization of
the resources. He goes on to show how colonialism destroyed these institutions and how resource
degradation inevitably resulted. Finally, he concludes demonstrating the need for reintroducing
appropriate local level common property resourcemanagement institutions inZimbabwe's communal
lands.
'Community development' has commonly been conceptualized in Africa as an extension to total levels
ofcentral government institutions (Murphree, 1993). For CBNRM to be effective, it is important that
communities have proprietorship of a natural resource (Murphree, 1993). Giving land tenure to a
community does notguarantee sound management ofnatural resources. Similarly it doesn't guarantee
that a CBNRM programme will succeed. Sound management is also not necessarily dependent on
tenurial reform. Many areas ofcommon property around the world are well managed, for example the
sea shore. Land is nevertheless considered to be an important way ofachieving effective community-
based management. This is stressed by Murphree (1993) :
"The evidence is that communities can become effective institutions for sustainable resource
management, but only if they are granted genuine proprietorship, that is, the right to use the resources,
determine the mode ofusage, benefit fully from their use, determine the distribution ofsuch benefits
and determine rules of access. Any policy which excludes these components will frustrate the goals
of making communities effective institutions for effective management".
Tenure gives ownership ofresources to community. Ownership entails the community having the right
to the value of the resource. The "focused value" of the resource was outlined as an important
principle of CBNRM by Murphree (1993). Communities also need tenure to establish rights of
inclusion and exclusion in a development programme. Tenure also gives a community the right to
decide whether to use the resource at all, the right to determine the mode and extent oftheir use, and
the right to benefit fully from this use in the way that they choose (Murphree, 1993) . Since no resource
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can be viewed in isolation, communities which claim and practice control over resources are
nevertheless accountable to society (Breen, pers. comm . 1999). In essence all resources have features
of common property even though they may also have characteristics of private property.
Looking back to the early days, to better understand the origins ofthe common agenda for reform, it
is useful to consider some of the key factors which triggered the process not only in wildlife but also
for other natural resources such as fisheries, for this particular case. As pointed by Steiner & Rihoy
(1995), these factors are as follows:
1. The threat ofthe species extinction, widespread poaching and loss of habitat: by the early
1980s poaching ofhigh-value species, encroachments into protected areas and loss ofhabitat
had - in many countries - reached crisis levels. Development needs and poverty began to
compete with conservation, with the latter clearly set to lose.
2. The growing inability of the State to protect its wildlife estate: the financial crisis facing
many governments in Africa and the low political priority accorded to conservation in the face
of other social and economic priorities, undermined the ability of the Departments to deploy
adequate staff and resources for wildlife management and protection.
3. Wildlife conservation and its colonial legacy: population growth and associated development
needs fueled the historical conflicts between local communities and protected areas/ wildlife
managers. Equity issues and compensation for a historical wrong required new answers and
strategies.
4. Linking conservation and development:two developments contributed to this new concept.
Participatory forms of planning and management had proven a success in development, thus
,
suggesting replication for wildlife management (Steiner & Rihoy, 1995) .
The factors which lead to environmental degradation are many and complex (de Wit, 1998). They may
arise simply because of population pressure, over-reliance on single commodities and indebtedness
de Wit (1998), pointed out that one way of identifying the causes of degradation is to analyze the
structure ofproperty rights and property rules. The management ofcommon property regimes is many
times misunderstood, leading to policy prescriptions which can easily give rise to serious instances
of land and natural resource degradation (de Wit, 1998).
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Fishing in the study area is considered by some village members (Saide, pers . comm., 1999) to be
characterized by an open access . It is argued that open access leads to over-exploitation and can
happen defacto in any property regime. Property right regimes consist ofproperty 'right' and property
' rules' (Bromley, 1991). Property rights are foundations of resource use, management and
conservation (IFAD, 1995). Property rights are privileges, and limitations for use of a particular
resource (Tietenberg, 1996). While property rules are the rules under which these rights, privileges
and limitations are exercised (Brorn1ey, 1991).
Many natural resources are not subject to efficient property rights regimes and therefore their true
value is not reflected in the market place. Environmental problems arise when one or more of the
conditions ofefficient property rights regimes are not met (Pearce et al. 1994). From the summary in
Table 2.5 it is evident that no one property rights regime is exclusively good for the environment,
although open access and state property regimes fare the worst. The former lacks all incentives for
conservation and the latter is vulnerable to personal motives of bureaucrats managing the state
systems.
Table 2.5 A typology of property rights regimes and conditions for efficiency:
Open access Common property Private property State property
Universality No Defined for the group Yes No
Exclusivity No Applies for the group Yes No
Transferability No Applies for the group Yes No
Enforceability No Yes: legal and social Yes: legal and social Yes: legal sanctions
sanctions sanctions
OVERALL Very low: Many regimes are Efficient but market Often inefficient due to
EFFICIENCY No incentive to efficient , but inherent failure occurs in Government failure
conserve risk of breakdown presence of
externalities and public
goods
Source: Pearce et al. (1994, Cited m de Wit 1998).
In the case of a common property regime, access to the scarcity rents are assigned to a group rather
than an individual (IFAD, 1995). The crucial point is whether social and legal structures recognize
and enforce the common property rights regime. It is a basic axiom that there is no property without
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authority. When this system ofauthority breaks down, management ofresources can no longer exist.
Common property regimes possess such an inherent risk of breakdown. Social and legal structures
within and around the group can fail when placed under strain. In these circumstances the property
right structure degrades into a system ofres nullius, or open access. It is in this setting that the well
known tragedy of the commons occurs (Hardin, 1968). However, various analysts (Larson and
Bromley, 1990; Dasgupta, 1982; Runge, 1981) have pointed out that this is not really a tragedy ofthe
commons, but a tragedy ofopen access. Although most land in the world belongs to someone, defacto
open access may prevail where any institution lacks the resources for effective management. It can be
concluded that the critical issue in not so much which property right regime prevails, but how well
property rights are defined (see also Hanna and Munashinghe, 1995).
The greatest challenge to CBNRM programmes has been the establishment of a management
framework that convinces communities that they have regained control over a resource (Steiner and
Rihoy, 1995). Most implementors now favour a dynamic approach to local level institution building.
Blueprints for CBNRM have not worked and implementation experience suggests that communities
should be given maximum opportunity to shape the structure and functioning of their management
entities, with Government confining its role to creating an enabling policy environment and providing
facilitation. The central question, however, remains how such a process can be best supported and by
whom. While the emergence policy framework appears to offer increasing scope for such community
driven processes, it must be recognized that all programmes have encountered significant problems
in providing institutional development support to communities (Steiner and Rihoy, 1995).
A review of discussion papers and programme documents reveals the emergence of four factors as
driving forces (Steiner and Rihoy, 1995). Again, Zambia and Zimbabwe were the first to experiment
with new approaches during the early 1980s. Followed by Botswana and Namibia in the early 1990s.
In each case, it was the ministry responsible for wildlife management that led the effort. This had a
number of implications, which are central to understanding some of the subsequent developments:
1. The initial driving force behind these programmes was a crisis situation - caused loss of
wildlife, land-use conflicts, financial constraints etc. While reformers advocated fundamental
changes traditionalists remained skeptical and reluctant to transfer wildlife management to
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communities.
2. The focus on wildlife meant that broader natural resource management issues have not featured
prominently in the programmes so far. Forestry, water, land-use planning and other related
issues, which 'belong' to other departments, have yet to become integrated within the
programmes.
3. In promoting new institutions for resource management at the local level, departments have
created the potential for conflict with other established local government and development
structures.
4. Attempting to rely on department staff to provide institutional development services and
community development support proved problematic. Turning 'policemen' into 'extension
workers' did not convince communities nor did it acknowledge the complexities oflocallevel
capacity building (Steiner and Rihoy, 1995).
Many people remain dependent on a productive natural resource base for a living. The long-term
health ofthe natural environment is threatened, however, byincreasing exploitation ofland, forest, and
water resources (fisheries) and by a growing population. As the ability of ecosystems to recover
diminishes, so too do the employment and lifestyle options open to local people. Millions of
livelihoods and irreplaceable storehouses ofbiodiversity may be lost forever.
To halt the erosion of their local resource base, the people living in affected communities often must
overcome physical and social barriers. Many live in remote areas far from markets and urban centres.
Others belong to ethnic groups with limited political influence. Within communities, some groups, like
women and children, may be furthe r marginalized by the existing power and gender relations.
Therefore, if we are to reverse the situation for example in fisheries, the approach will be to assist
local people (women and men) living in ecosystems that face increasing resource exploitation to
manage and use their natural resources sustainably. This will be done in a way that recognizes that
men, women, ethnic groups, and different social classes use natural resources in diverse ways and for
distinct purposes. The initiative in sustainable natural resource use will take the following approach:
community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) approaches that are innovative,
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equitable, sustainable, and replicable;
policy-related research to ensure that local and national policies are gender sensitive and
consistent with sustainable natural resource management systems at the community level;
research and management processes that are participatory;
technological, social, and organizational innovations that respond to priorities defined by the
men and women of local communities.
the integration of natural science components, such as resource assessment and production
technologies, with a social science perspective that address decision-making processes,
institutional development; and
a regional networkon research methods and approaches for analyzing environmentalproblems
and as a means to build and strengthen CBNRM practices.
The above initiative in sustainable natural resource use will support research that concentrates on:
enhancing livelihood options, food security, and improvements in the well-being of the
different members of communities;
how to reverse the practices that lead to degradation of the natural resource base;
providing a clear understanding ofpower and gender relations within communities to promote
policies and programmes that enable women and other disadvantaged groups to contribute
more actively to the effective management of a community's natural resources;
developing an understanding oflocal and national policies that promote and enhance CBNRM;
developing new gender sensitive methods, processes, technologies, and policies in support
of CBNRM; and
adopting and refining innovations developed under support byother donors, governments,non-
governmental organizations, and local communities.
The shift towards community-based approaches to conservation that has occurred across Africa since
the late 1980s (Hulme and Murphree [n.d.]) has been a belated step in the right direction. Such
initiatives have made conservation marginally more relevant to the needs oflocal society; have pushed
the conceptualization of the role of rural Africans in conservation from 'potential criminals' to
'communities who can participate inwildlife and resource management'; have led to a recognition that
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conservation does not automatically entail that Africans be separated from habitats that are to be
conserved; and, have partially opened up conservation resources to market forces (Hulme and
Murphree [n.d.]). However, its greatest contribution is not what it has achieved in terms of
conservation outcomes but the opportunity it has created for the establishment of' a new conservation'
that has social legitimacy. This step sees a role for Africans not merely as bit players who share in
local level benefits and may be passively involved in wildlife management, but as citizens with a right
to engage in the specification of the goals ofconservation, the formulation ofpolicy and demanding
that the state accounts for the results of conservation action (Hulme and Murphree [n.d.]).
The ' new conservation' faces many challenges and, if it is to be operationalised, would have to
overcome many problems. It does, however, present a vision of the direction in which African
conservation could evolve. It represents a radical challenge to those who currently hold sway in
conservation policy and practice - from rangers and wardens at the local level, to senior conservation
bureaucrats, politicians and NGOs at the national level and environmental agencies and aid donors
at the international level - and it can be anticipated that they will be reluctant to cede control and
influence (Hulme and Murphree [n.d.]). It faces severe obstacles in many African countries where
governance has been weak, or bad, and citizens have been conditioned to see themselves as subjects
(Hulme and Murphree [n.d.]).
It is the only "long-term future" to which conservation should aspire to evolve. To continue to seek
to achieve conservation goals through coercion in states that are poorly and repressively governed is
immoral as it reinforces the processes of poor governance (Peluso,1993, in Hulme and Murphree
[n.d.]).
2.4 CBNRM and fisheries management
Inland fisheries provide significant contributions to animal protein supplies in many rural areas . In
some regions freshwater fish represent an essential, often irreplaceable, source of high quality and
cheap animal protein crucial to the balance of diets in marginally food secure communities (FAO,
1998).
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In most inland fisheries produce is consumed locally, marketed domestically or in nearby towns, and
often contributes to the subsistence and livelihood ofthe poor people in the rural areas (FAO, 1998).
In some areas , such as along Rovuma river, specifically in the study area, increasingly fishery
products are also traded internationally generating additional wealth. The extent of participation,
including a significant number ofwomen and younger people in fishing, fish processing and trading
can be high in some rural areas , and this can be considered as a very important source ofemployment
that can alleviate poverty in these areas (FAO, 1998).
Fish in the ocean, lakes and rivers cannot easily be owned. Anindividual or community may lay claim
rights ofcapture and even to demarcate where such capture may occur and under what conditions, but
as the fish are mobile and can move into or out ofthe demarcated space it is almost impossible for the
individual or group claim ownership ofthe fish (Breen, pers . comm. 1999). Tenure in river fisheries
may, consequently, havemore to do with the land and water, and rights to capture, and less to do with
fish.
The application of CBNRM to fisheries must, therefore, focus on tenurial rights of water and the
associated land, and the rules ofcapture. Because fish can move into and out ofareas , as does water ,
it is also inconceivable to envisage CBNRM being applied to a river fishery in isolation from what
happens upstream and downstream (Breen, pers. comm.1999), including control which may be
exercised over flow in the river.
Aquatic systems exhibit a high degree of interconnectedness. This reflects their natural ecosystems
properties and their relationships with people. Some of the driving forces of systems functioning
originate remotely from the system, the flows in a river originates distant from any point in that river;
the fish move in response to flow; and human activities reflect this continuous and often unpredictable





Since the cessation of warfare and the subsequent establishment of a democratic government in
Mozambique, there has been a strong move to re-establishment in rural areas. One such initiative is
focused on the Niassa Province, as shown in Figure 1.1. The SPFFB together with IUCN and the
participation ofother local organizations (e.g. ACORD and OPORTUN), are promoting CBNRM as
a way of achieving sustainable use of natural resources in the study area. The fishery along
Lucheringo-Rovuma and Messinge rivers and related flood plains is one sector receiving attention.
3.2 Location
The area is located in the north eastern region of Niassa Province, falling within the District ofSanga
(Figure 3.2). To the West ofthe study area lies the Messinge river and District ofLago and to the east
is the Lucheringo river. To the north is the Rovuma river which forms the border between




Topography and the drainage systems
Key topographic and striking natural features in the study area are the outstanding Inselbergs, Sanga
Mountain (1,790 metres) and Logorongo Mt rising from the Rovuma plain to 1,105 metres and the
bordering rivers ofMessinge, Rovumaand Lucheringo, which are also the most prominent drainage
systems in the area. The rest of the area is incised by broad shallow valleys formed by many other
river systems that drain the area. The Messinge and Lucheringo valleys are, however, dominant. The
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area between the rivers and the mountains comprises undulating terrain with clear drainage systems.
The Rovuma river rises in Tanzania, and forms the border between Tanzania and Mozambique (Figure
1.1), winding about 730 km from its confluence with Messinge river to its mouth in the Indian Ocean
(Amaral 1990). The Messinge and Lucheringo rivers are perennial and principal tributary rivers of
the Rovuma river.
There are a number of floodplains and lakes extending adjacent to the Rovuma river, which provide
a good combination of natural biota and fishing grounds, particularly during dry season, when the
water levels are low (pers. obs .). Among these, are the Matomondo, Lukongoele and Chijunichana
lakes (Rovuma floodplains); and Makawanga, Mwawte and Namissinge lakes in the interior.
Geology and Soils
There are open floodplains and many inselbergs in the area, revealing that these were produced by
the slow energetic erosive forces in the past. Amaral (1990), pointed out that these orogenic
movements which extended the GreatRift Valley towards Mozambique, have been responsible for the
geologic faults, lying in a north-east to south-west direction in the region. These led to the formation
ofthe mountain ranges, between which lies Sanga mountain in the western part ofthe district. Other
geologic faults, also extending in the same direction, led to the formation of the depressions and
valleys where the Messinge, Lucheringo and the Lugenda rivers run towards Rovuma river (Amaral,
1990).
Tello & Dutton (1979) stated that geologically, the major part ofthis region is considered to be part
of the "Mozambique belt" with Karoo and post-Karoo. The geology and soils of the area are well
described in the "Atlas Geografico de Mocambique 1979". However, there has been no detailed soil
survey of the area, but the fertile alluvial soils along the rivers and water courses, consist
predominantly of sandy loam and poorly drained soils (Tello & Dutton, 1979).
The fertile alluvial soils make much ofthe area good for crop production, especially along the rivers
and water courses. The most common crops produced in the area include maize, cassava, sweet
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potato, millet, peanuts and beans. Others (cash crops) include tobacco and sugar cane (pers. obs.) .
Climate
According to Esboco do Reconhecimento Ecologico de Mocambique, cited in Amaral (1990) there
are two well defined seasons in the area. These are the rain season, from December until March. April
is a transitional month; and a dry season from May until November (see Table 3.3. 1). The proportion
of the rain which falls during the dry season in relation to total annual is relatively small.
Table 3.3.1 Medium monthly rainfall values (mm) of three areas in Niassa Province.
Posts Posts
Months Months
V. Cabral Litunde Maniamba V. Cabral Litunde Maniamba
(Lchinga) (Lichinga)
January 270,5 324,8 290,0 July 1,8 2,3 1,5
February 180,1 226,9 268,6 August 0,0 4,0 3,4
March 287,7 273,8 290,1 September 0,7 2,5 1,6
April 71,0 101,9 154,4 October 13,6 19,3 24,6
May 40,6 16,9 31,7 November 34,3 45,8 74,9
June 1,7 3,8 24,9 December 194,4 210,0 215,2
Source: Esboco do Reconhecimento Ecologico-Agricola de Mocambique, 1995 in Amaral (1990).
The maximum temperatures are noted between October and December ( Table 3.3.2) and the lowest
temperatures between June and August (see Table 3.3.3).
Table 3.3.2 Maximum Mean temperatures (oC) in three areas in Niassa Province.
Posts Posts
Months Months
V. Cabral Litunde Maniamba V. Cabral Litunde Maniamba
(Lchinga) (Lichinga)
January 25,1 26,9 25,6 July 21,5 23,9 22,8
February 25,8 27,3 25,6 August 22,7 24,7 24,2
March 24,9 26,8 25,4 September 25,8 27,0 26,3
April 24,5 26,5 24,9 October 28,8 29,7 29,6
May 23,2 27,7 24,3 November 27,8 30,8 28,8
June 21,8 24,2 23,0 December 26,6 28,7 26,3
Source: Esboco do Reconhecimento Ecologico-Agricola de Mocambique, 1995 in (Amaral, 1990) .
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Table 3.3.3 Minimum Mean temperatures (oC) in three Posts in Niassa Province.
Posts Posts
Months Months
V. Cabral Litunde Maniamba V. Cabral Litunde Maniamba
(Lichinga) (Lichinga)
January 16,0 18,1 17,2 July 9,8 11,7 11,1
February 16,0 17,5 17,1 August 10,2 12,7 12,0
March 15,8 17,1 16,1 September 12,3 14,4 13,8
April 14,3 16,2 15,3 October 14,9 15,1 16,3
May 12,0 14,2 12,9 November 15,7 15,5 17,7
June 9,6 12,2 12,0 December 15,9 15,4 17,1
Source: Esboco do Reconhecimento Ecologico-Agricola de Mocambique, 1955 ill Amaral (1990).
It is difficult to classify the climate of a vast area with very variable topography, but generally the
climate, can be classified as humid, mesothermic, with deficient rains in winter (Amaral, 1990).
The implication is that, the highly variable climate makes agricultural production, particularly crop
production for nutritional needs unreliable in areas like Madeira (Figure 3.2) . The population is thus
highly vulnerable in terms of food insecurity and malnutrition. These factors lead one to appreciate
that people's perspectives are shaped by these persistent shortages.
Infrastructure
The study area has limited and relatively poor infrastructure. It is connected to the main settlement
areas (Matchedje, Madeira and II Congresso on the Rovuma - Matchedge administrative post, north)
to the administrative post ofMacaloge (in the south) by the unrehabilitated old 'Portuguese' road,
cutting across the area (Figure 3.2). The road is impassable during the rainy season, when it quickly
deteriorates.However, under a CBNRM programme locallyknown as "Chipange Chetu" (Our wealth)
initiated in 1999, the roads are being rehabilitated.
Because ofthe deterioration ofthe internal road network system, mainly due to destruction ofbridges
during the war, there is no public transport, or communication system such as telephone operating in
the area. This isolates the area and its people from the other areas in the Province. It also complicates
research and development. For example, in order to travel from Matchedje to other areas adjacent to
Rovuma (further north-east), the researcher had to walk for six days through the forest and bush
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grassland. There are no facilities along the way he had to camp. There were many interesting
experiences with wildlife, particularly leopards and elephants!
3.3.2 Biotic features
Vegetation
The vegetation of the region, is not well known. According to Amaral (1990), studies of the
vegetation that cover the whole area are limited and mostly not available. However, due to the nature
of the soils and the climatic conditions, the area is dominated by Brachystegia species making up a
miombo woodland type of vegetation. These include Brachystegia floribunda, Brachystegia
appendiculata, Brachystegia apertifolia, Afromosia angolenis, Bauhinia petersiana, Pterocarpus
angolensis, Combretum gueiinzii, Securidaca longepedunculata, Pseudolachnostylis
maprouneifolia, Terminalia sericea, Albizzia versicolor and Lonchocarpus capassa.
Fauna
The civil war was a period when mammal populations within the area where severely depleted, as
was the case in other parts of the country. This was because both sides in the conflict used wildlife
resources to support their war efforts. Elephant ivory and rhino horns were sold to raise cash to buy
arms while game meat was used to feed not only soldiers present in Niassa, but also exported to feed
soldiers stationed in other provinces (Tilley and Abacar, 1996). The current CBNRM programme
and law enforcement due to presence ofSPFFB staffwithin the area is having some effect in terms of
reducing the incidence of illegal hunting ofwildlife (Anstey, pers. eomm. 1999).
The area is still reported to have a high diversity of game animals, including species like elephant,
buffalo, hippopotamus, eland, sable, kudu, hartebeest, zebra, impala, lion, leopard, etc, including
protected species such as wild-hunting dogs (Anstey, pers. comm. 1999).
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3.3.3 Social features
Origins of the people
The Yao or Ajauas are said to be the indigenous african people who lived between the Rovuma and
the Lugenda region (Figure 1.1), and they are frequently referred to inPortuguese documents since 18th
century (Amaral, 1990).
The dominant second language now spoken by these people throughout the area is Kiswahili. The
dominance of Swahili intensifies in the northern villages of the area. Proximity to Tanzania where
Kiswahili is the national language, undoubtedly accounts for its dominance. This dominance was
probably intensified as a result of the migration to Tanzania during the civil war. Kiswahili use is
most pronounced amongst young people. This is probably because many young people now living in
the area were born and grew up in Tanzania. Yao , and to a lesser extent Portuguese languages, are
mixed inwith Kiswahili. Portuguese is more dominant in towns because ofthe presence ofgovernment
staff
The dominant religion (Islam) is integrated with the traditional worship of the spirits of the
forefathers . Traditional healers are consulted on a variety of issues and can be called upon to deal
with evil spirits (pers. Obs .). Islam represents more than 90% ofthe local population, with a minority
of Christians (Anstey, pers. Comm. 1999).
Organization
The 1997 human population census , estimated the population of Sanga District to be 33,500 people.
The approximate population in the study area is 4,000 people. There are 5 to 6 individuals per
household; the overall population density in the area is about 1 person per square kilometer (Anstey,
pers. comm. 1999) .
The area is presided over by a traditional chiefwho locally in Yao language is known as "Mwenye",
and a number of head men also known as "N' dunas", each of whom is responsible for a particular
family group, and are answerable to Mwenye (pers. obs.) . However, Mwenye answers directly to the
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local government authority either in Matchedje or Macaloge Administrative Posts, (Figure 3.3.3).
In the past, traditional authority had substantial responsibility including resolution ofsocial problems,
processing development applications, allocation of land rights and maintenance of law and order.
Structures for the participation ofpeople in decision making have been in place in the form of tribal
and regional authorities.
The people in a series of small villages that are concentrated in the south and far north along the road
to the Rovuma river (Figure 3.2).
Consequences of the war
The insecurity associated with war encouraged people to live in close settlements (villages) and
mobility was reduced. With the cessation ofwar agriculture is again practiced further from home, and
in some areas slash and burn practices have been reestablished.
Sharing a river as a boundary between Mozambique and Tanzania means that the river and its
resources are viewed as the property ofboth countries. There is continual human movement back and
forth across the river. Weak definition and enforcement of the boundary allows those who are
' strong' to gain access to and control over the use of resources (refer to Chapter 6). In this case the
'strong' may be from an adjoining country where markets are greater and more easily engaged.
Economy
The socio-economic status ofnorthern Sanga, is characterized by high levels ofunemployment; low
levels of adult literacy and formal education; high dependency on foreign currency; and low
population densities (Rachide, pers . comm. 1999).
Agriculture is the predominant economic activity for the majority ofthe households, however they are
defined as deficit farmers since production levels do not constantly meet the households nutritional
needs (Rachide, pers . comm. 1999) . Most households are heavily dependent on external sources of
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income, either through barter and/or fish sale, particularly in Matchedje area and N'kolesi (north-east
of the study area). Fishing also play an important part of the local socio-economy, but the people of
this area appear to be primarily agriculturalists and sometimes hunters (pers . Obs.).
This is a 'typical' remote rural area in the district; unemployment and poverty are common-place and
infrastructure is poor including schools and clinics.
The high levels ofmobility, since cessation ofwar, are a feature of the dominant north-south trading
pattern that is a fundamental characteristic ofthe area (pers . obs) . The most important traded resource
appears to be fish going northin exchange for a variety ofgoods coming south (Plate 7). Cross-border
trading in one form or another appears to be much more important than that with the rest of Sanga
District. The limited trade south is centered on Macaloge and Unango towns where goods are
purchased with Mozambican currency. The normal mediums ofexchange further north are either by
using Tanzanian shilling or bartering.
The dominant subsistence activity for people living in the area is agriculture. There are no farming
activities that can be described as 'commercial' , although some tobacco and sugar cane are also
cultivated and only products in excess of household needs are sold or bartered. The principal crops
grown are maize, cassava, banana, sweet-potato, rice, beans, millet and peanuts.
A typical pattern of production found in most villages is that families have a primary home located
within the nucleus ofthe village. Around the home typically cassava, cowpeas and a few bananas are
grown. The main areas for agriculture production are on cultivated areas located on the seasonally
flooded plains of the rivers and streams. Normally a seasonal hut and one or more members will be
maintained on these cultivated areas. After harvest ofthe main staple crops normally in June and July,
the family moves back to the village home (pers . obs.) .
Malaria has always been a danger in the area, followed by diarrhoea resulting from poor water
quality, especially during the rain season (November-April). Other illnesses result from respiratory
diseases , tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases (anon., 1997) .
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The presence of'tse-tse fly has probably contributed to relatively low numbers ofdomesticated stock
in the area, a few families have goats.
Administration
The civil war between Frelimo and Renamo resulted in a collapse of the state functions and its
structures within the area . The government administrative structures ofthe area are still re-establishing
after the elections of 1994. To a certain extent there is some dual administration (Frelimo and
Renamo) that reflects the situation in other parts ofNi assa province. A new development this year
(1999) is the inclusion oftraditional authorities into the system oflocal management committees taking
responsibility for the management of wildlife resources in the area . This is as a part of an overall
processes of decentralization and promotion of CBNRM.
Traditional structures
The Portuguese reinforced the traditional structures of power. These were based on the male head,
such as the chiefs. The chiefs were eoopted into the administrative system during the Portuguese time
by using different inducements. These included providing them with a salary, exempting them from the
need to pay tax , and decreasing their civil power (N'tabalika, pers . comm. 1999) . Inreturn, traditional
local customs such as holding ceremonies to encourage rains were maintained and sometimes
encouraged (N 'tabalika, pers . comm . 1999) .
Government
The study area falls under the District Administration of Sanga, with the headquarters in Unango, in
the south, where the offices of the District Directorates ofAgriculture and Fisheries, Education and
Health are located. The local administrations in the study area (Macaloge and Mathedje
localities/wards) are directly answerable to the District Administrator of Sanga District.
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NGOs
There are no NGOs based in the area, but the IUCN is currently involved in the implementation ofa
CBNRM programme in collaboration with the provincial government responsible for Wildlife and
Forestry (SPFFB) in the area. Other NGOs such as OPORTUN and ACORD based in Lichinga town
of Niassa, are also involved in the programme.
3.4 Implications
The evidence indicates that there have been a number ofdriving forces which have directed the fishery
from one which in all probability was operated under a common property regime, to one in which a
control in individual and the user group definition loses clarity is that to an open access regime .
Super imposed on this is the move by government to ' return' the fishery to a common property regime .
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Figure 3.3.3 There are two traditional authority zones in the study area, both fall under
Mwenye / Malingalile. The names and Nduna's are shown. In recent times





Mozambique is emerging from the destructive impact of25 years ofwar and is going through a period
ofsignificant changes: from single to multi-party politics; from a centralized to free market economy;
and from refugees and war to new investments and developments (anon., 1999). This process of
change includes the development of new policies and legislation to change the role of the state, .
communities and the private sector in the management of natural resources, bringing in a new
transitional era. Emphasis lies on the devolution ofmanagement and control to communities and the
development of new partnerships between stakeholders.
The transition towards community management approaches over natural resources (CBNRM), has
represented a significant change in theoretical thinking about the future ofthe local communities in the
rural society .
4.2 National trend
The country has a colonial history stretching back 500 years with independence attained in 1975.
Unlike most other countries in the region the colonial power lacked both administrative and financial
capacity to impose a new administration in the country, and largely operated under forms ofindirect
rule with the result that inmost ofthe country customary systems remained relatively unaffected (anon.,
1999). The customary systems came under greater threat with the adoption of socialism after
independence which viewed customary institutions as archaic remnants ofthe past. Land and natural
resources became state property, administered, managed and regulated centrally by the government.
In reality the state never had either the institutional capacity or funds to undertake this role, and the
indigenous systems persisted. Since the end ofthe conflict in 1992 a more conciliatory approach has
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been adopted, but all land and natural resources remained the state property, and security of tenure
for the communal sector remains weak (anon., 1999).
The country has one of the lowest population densities in the region and is comparatively resource
rich. Approximately 7% of the country is currently cultivated, forest cover is estimated at 600,000
square kilometers and halfofthe country supports less than 15people/km2. These features suggest that
CBNRM has considerable potential in the country both in rural development and biodiversity
conservation.
In Niassa Province, northern Mozambique, although the 25 years ofconflict had considerable impact
on wildlife populations, the intractable problem seems to be of open access towards wildlife and
fisheries (Anstey, pers . comm. 1999). The primary threat to the fisheries resource base over the last
5 years appears to be the increasing exploitation offish and utilization offish poisoning by both plants
and chemicals, indicating lack of control and weak management systems. Essentially the fisheries
situation in the area appears to be a classic case of open access with no common property regime or
government control process in place to promote sustainable use . Therefore, the process ofdeveloping
management strategies and transforming the presumed open access to some other kindofmanagement
state (common property resource management) that would establish control over use ofthe resource
will be of particular interest.
In open access systems, individuals strive to optimise their individual benefits . The tendency is to
view others as competitors for the resource . Competitive advantage is gained through increasing
effort and changing technology. Thus the strategies and actions are modified continuously to increase
personal gain. The individual monitors his or her own stream ofbenefits (not the state ofthe resource),
compares these with requirements and adapts strategy (effort, process and technology) accordingly .
In CBNRM people (a group ofusers) share a vision ofsustained flow ofbenefits for the resource; a
flow which is equitably distributed amongst stakeholders. Their strategies are, therefore, centrered
on securing the long-term future ofthe resource; identifying and using technology and effort which is
appropriate; and monitoring the state ofthe resource (rather than simply the state ofthe return to the
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individual); and ensuring equitable distribution of costs and benefits.
Breen et al. (1998) have described a management process which reflects CBNRM (Figure 4.1). The
process is "driven" by a partnership between users (stakeholders) and regulators (government). They
jointly define their vision for the resource and the manner in which it is to be used ; they then describe
this in quantifiable terms (Desired State of the resource ). With this in place they are able to set
measurable and achievable goals and objectives; and identify the tasks to be actioned. Monitoring
access in a manner which enables the participants to audit whether their vision of Desired State is
being achieved . Since the future is uncertain and knowledge and understanding is imperfect , the
process has to anticipate the future and operate continuously. This process has been defined as
Strategic Adaptive Management (Rogers and Bestbier, 1997).
CBNRM (and CBFM) initiatives are not projects with a defined beginning and end. They are not time
based (Maughan-Brown , 1998). They are continuous processes. Thus, it is not simply a case of
introducing CBNRM projects. Rather it is necessary to introduce a culture ofadaptive management
which continuously seeks to anticipate the future and act accordingly. The culture ofthe organization,
in this case the partnership, is a strong determinant ofsuccess in a changing environment (Senge, 1994
and Breen et al. 1998).
The hypothesis of this research is that the fisheries in the study area have been transformed from a
common property to open access system under the influence of historical and contemporary forces
(Figure 4.2). It is further reasoned that intervention to effect a return to a common property system















Figure 4.1. Adaptive management process. In CBNRM the process isunderjoint control ofregulators
and resource users . In open access systems each individual implements the process individually.
Adapted from Breen, et al. (1998).
4.3 Management state
In pre-colonial times communities managed the use of the resources as common property systems
(Murombedzi, 1990). Colonization brought with it many changes including marginalization from
resources and inequalities in rural society which reflected patterns of resource use (Breen et al.
1998). There is evidence that, at least in some instances , fisheries were common property systems
(Murombedzi, 1990). Colonization undermined community resource use systems, opting the way for
increasingly self-centrered approaches to resource use and to individuals claiming resources as a
private property or at least .the property ofa select few and, in other instances, to allow uncontrolled
access. Thus the fishery in the study area may have been a common property system; and it may have
been transformed to an open access system. Clearly it is desirable to understand changes and the
present management system in order for government to designits strategies for intervention.This forms
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the focus ofthe research reported here. Inorder to provide a structure for this research an attempt was
made to conceptualise the manner in the fishery has changed, which molded this change. This
conceptual framework (Figure 4.2) is based on impressions gained in discussion with people fro the
area, and with people who have visited and/or worked in the area. The framework provided a
rationale for formulation ofthe questionnaire and for the discussion held with stakeholders during the
fieldwork phase of the research.
The framework postulates a change from community based fisheries management to open access.
Primary driving forces are considered to be colonisation, with amounted influences ofreligion, which
led to changes in traditional controls, norms and values and finally to altered behaviour. Population
growth and a change to monetary economies led to growing market which, because ofthe weakening
of controls, enabled individuals to optimise personal benefit independently ofgroup benefit.
The purpose of the research was to determine whether there is evidence that the fishery was under
common property regime; whether it is now an open access regime; and what factors have directed





































































Figure 4.2 A conceptual framework depicting the postulated





The properties ofthe study area and its people determined in a major way the approach, methods and
scale of this research. So, too did the time allocation (5 months) placed on the process by rules
regulating the Master's degree.
The study area is remote and poorly serviced. Most people are illiterate and those exploiting the fish
resource are from different communities and different countries. The only meaningful way ofgathering
information about local people's perceptions is by way ofpersonal interviews. The distances between
villages, the absence ofpassable roads and lack ofpublic transport, placed further constraints on what
could be done .
This study should, therefore, be interpreted as a preliminary investigation which can guide future ,
better resourced (personnel,finance, equipment and time) studies :
5. 2 Developing a conceptual framework
A conceptual framework reflecting fisheries management and CBNRM was constructed (Figure 4.2) .
This was used to establish the philosophical basis of the research, namely that of using CBNRM to
catalyse a change from open access to common property resource use . It also provided a framework
for reviewing the literature and structuring the interviews.
The researcher was familiar with the area having been based in Niassa Game Reserve (Figure 1.1)
situated to the east of the study area . He lived on the Reserve for three years as an employee of
DNFFB (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries) with technical and financial support of IUCN and
Niassa Investments (a private sector company involved in the management ofthe Reserve) . During this
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period certain impressions formed . The hypothesis was constructed speculating a change , since
colonisation, from a common property resource management system to one of open access.
It is the stated intention of government to reinstate community-based resource management. This,
together with the provisional understanding of the fishery elucidated through construction of the
conceptual framework, enabled the researcher to establish a research process based on interviews .
The intention was to reject, modify or confirm the conceptual framework (Figure 4.2) and to consider
prospects for returning the fishery to a common property resource management process.
5.3 Literature review
The government ofMozambique is promoting Community-Based Natural Resource Management. It
was necessary, therefore, to develop a comprehensive understanding of CBNRM. Of particular
relevance are the process, the role players and their functions, and how these change over time. The
literature was reviewed with this in mind. It was also directed at understanding property regimes, as
ownership and access have been considered important in successful CBNRM.
The understanding developed enabled the researcher to consider the preparedness ofgovernment to
facilitate the process of reestablishing CBNRM of the fishery.
Reports from the DNP , IDPPE, lIP and documents from other relevant departments related to natural
resource managementand community involvement programmes such asDNFFB and UMC (Community
Management Unit/DNFFB), UGC (Coastal Management Unit/MICOA) were studied for relevant
information on fishing, history and the welfare of the communities under study.
5.4 Network
Effective implementation of CBNRM requires integration vertically from national to local levels of
government, and horizontal integration between role players at the various levels. It would be
impossible to develop the intended understanding in the absence of a network which facilitated
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establishing contacts, conducting interviews, and discussing interpretations of findings.
Networking was developed with the provincial body responsible for fisheries (Department of
Fisheries , Niassa), Provincial and District Directorates ofAgriculture and Fisheries, mCN, and other
CBNRM programme implementors. This facilitated gathering of data and developing understanding
of fisheries management systems. Through the network it was possible to organise public meetings,
group discussions, and to hold structured and unstructured interviews with focus groups and key
informants.The nature ofthe network and methods used depend on the type and quality ofinformation
required, socio-economic and political setting, time frame and resources available and the type of
research problem. For acquiring accurate insights these methods can be combined .
5.5 Surveys: questionnaire and approach
The steps followed in setting up interviews are shown in Figure 5.1.
General impressions and discussions with colleagues led to formulation ofthe conceptual framework.
This was used to direct the literature review and to formulate questionnaires (Appendix 1, 2, and 3).
The framework directed enquiry to determine:
whether recollections of the fishers were that the fishery operated as a common property
system, in which there were both a defined community ofusers and controls over use;
whether there was evidence to support the hypothesis that the fishery currently operates as an
open access system;
the nature of forces which have brought about such change; and
whether people were satisfied with the present situation and if not, why not.
The level of illiteracy in the study area were such that information had to be gathered by way of
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Figure 5.1 The sequence of steps leading to design, implementation and synthesis .
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Structured interviews
Structured interviews are those that use questionnaires based on a predetermined and standardised or
identical set ofquestions. Each question is read and the response is recorded on a standardised pre-
coded (usually) schedule.
With structured interviews the researcher is able to make direct comparisons between respondents
given the commonality ofquestions asked and the standardisation of the interview experience. In so
doing it enhances the degree of reability offindings (Cohen and Marion, 1994).
Structured interviews have been criticised by a number of writers (Chambers, 1983; Cohen and
Marion, 1994; Neuman, 1994). However, this criticism is one way ofcollecting accurate data as long
as the interview is able to establish a good rapport, ask the questions in an acceptable manner and
respondents choose to co-operate (Kitwood, 1977 cited in Cohen and Marion, 1994).
Semi-structured interviews
Semi-structured interviews are non-standardised interviews. In these interviews the researcher will
have a list of themes and questions to be covered, although these may vary from interview .to
interview. This means that the researcher may omit some questions in particular interviews given the
specific organisational context which is encountered in relation to the research topic . The order of
questions may also be varied depending on the flow ofthe conversation. On the other hand, additional
questions may be required to explore research issues and objectives , given the nature ofevents within
particular organisations. The nature ofthe questions and the ensuing discussion requires that data are
recorded by note taking or, perhaps, by tape recording the conversation.
Unstructured interviews
Unstructured interviews are informal. They are used to explore in depth a general area in which the
researcher is interested. These are also referred as in-depth interviews. There is no predetermined
list ofquestions to work through is this situation, although the researcher needs to have a clear idea
about the aspects to be explored. The interviewee is given the opportunity to talk freely about the
events, behavior and beliefs in relation to the topic , so that this type ofinteraction is sometimes called
49
non-directive. It has been labelled as an informant interview since it is the interviewee's perceptions
which guide the conduct of the interview. In comparison, respondent interview is one where the
interviewer directs the interview and the interviewee responds to the questions of the researcher
(Saunders et al. 1997).
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5.6 Survey process
= less frequent;
Once the questionnaire had been formulated and the approach designed the process ofconducting the
survey was initiated .
On arrival in a village the researcher would approach the headman (N'duna) to introduce himself, his
purpose for being there and to request permission and support for the research.The N'duna would then
call together senior advisors forming a focus group, normally numbering between two and four people .
A focus group interview followed in which there was intense open-ended discussion around issues
identified in the framework and questionnaire. Such interviews .are a valuable way of collecting
qualitative information and is considered to be an effective way of collecting information (Cellier,
1994; Cohen and Marion, 1994) .
These ad hoc focus groups assisted the researcher to identify people in the village that could be
interviewed. These were in two categories, key informants and artisans .
Key informants are defined as individuals who are likely to provide needed information, ideas and
insights on particular subjects (Kumar, 1989). It is possible to collect useful information from a few
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members of the communitywho are particularly knowledgeable about certain matters.
For this study it meant those people who are chiefs or community leaders in the village (have social
or political influence), experienced fishermen, and those who are involved in the natural resource
managementprogramme e.g. ChipangeChetu project and are professionals.Nichols (1991)mentions
that key informants are most reliable on factual matters.
Unstructured interviews were conducted with the key informants and the focus groups. Responses
were grouped according to similarities. This provided a basis for describingperceptions, knowledge
on fisheries managementpractices in the past as compared to the present situation, as well as gaining
insight into the driving forces involved.
5.7 Selecting the sample
Respondents were chosen using the chainreferral sampling method. This entailedasking a preceding
respondent to recommend others who shouldbe interviewed(Babbie, 1995).Thisprocedure, initiated
in focus group meetings, led to identification of people to be interviewed. The process allowed a
continuallyexpanding sample to be developed. Not all people recommended could be interviewed,
as some they were not available at the time.
The identified and recommended respondents were interviewedand after the interviewsthey, in turn
made their recommendations. This sampling method was consideredappropriate for this type of field
research because it was critical to choose people with a comprehensive understanding of fisheries
resource use and knowledge about the issues and problems related to fisheries management.
According to Babbie (1995) the sample derivedthrough this approach is termed a purposive sample.
An analysis of interviewees is presented in Table 5.2.
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5.8 Personal observation
The study required long walking trips from five to seven days . During these trips, it was possible for
the researcher to form general impressions by both direct observation and through ad hoc
conversations with people along the way. These enabled the researcher to seek explanations for
observed activities (see Plates 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10) and attitudes, in relaxed and
unthreatening situations.
It was necessary to have guides who could assist the researcher on the field trips providing direction,
translation, interpretation and introductions. Potential guides who were identified by the village
headmen during the focus group meetings volunteered to participate in the research. The researcher
remunerated them when the field work was completed. Six guides drawn from two villages, Madeira
and Machedje, participated in the study.
5.9 Interpretation
Responses to questions and information drawn from notes taken in the field were aggregated according
to how they informed the four key issues identified in the research framework, namely:
There is inevitably some degree of subjectivity in interpreting and assessing the responses of
interviewees, particularly when the process is based on unstructured or semi-structured interviews.
However, the greater the number ofsimilar responses the more likely it is that the view expressed has
a strong foundation in society. The results are expressed as the number of respondents holding a
common view. This allowed the researcher to discern whether views expressed were commonly held
among key informants and/ or artisans, or whether they were 'outlier' opinions of one or two
individuals. In this way the researcher was able to assess the information assembled.
Table 5.2 Stakeholder interviewed/met during the study.
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COMNIUNITY MEMBERS EXTERNAL NETWORK
Key Informants National Directorate for Fisheries Administration
Village representatives - Co-National Director for Fisheries
- Madeira Village Secretary (1)
Institute for Development of Fisher ies of Small Scale




DNFFBIUMC (Community Natural Resource
Villa ge council/committee memb ers Management Unit)
- Madeira local council/committee (2) - National Director
- UMC Co-ordinator
- Matchedje local council/committee (2)
IUCN
TOTAL = 10 - Country representative
Artisans Provincial Directorate of Agriculture and Fisheries
- Fishermen (46) - Provincial Director
- Fish processors (4) Provincial Department for Fisheries
• Chief of the Department
TOTAL = 50
Local Government
-Chief ofMacaloge Administrative Post
- Secretary of
INTERNAL NETWORK - District Director for Agriculture and Fisheries
Chipan ge Chetu Project staff in the villages IUCN-Niassa
- Headof the Game Guards - Project Co-ordinator (Chipange Chetu)
CommunitylVillage Game Guards SPFFBIIUCN Chipan ge Ch etu Project
- Lilumba Village - Head of Game Scouts





Plate 1. A fishing trip can usually take one to two weeks. Smoked/dried fish is packed in baskets
ready to be transported on foot or bicycle to market in Tanzaia.
Plate 2. Women are recognised for their contribution in fishing activities, particularly in fish
processing and trading. Fish at a local market is sold in parcels of 5,000 Meticais.
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Plate3. Women spend muchof their time collectingfire wood and guarding the camp againsttheft. Men
do most of the smoking.
Plate 4. A 30 m gill net was set over night. The types of fish caught are shown.
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Plate 5. A fishing foray usually involves at least two people, one being an experienced fisherman.
Plate 6. Fishing practices are also adopted by young boys. The bark of a tree is used for construction
of fishing crafts for use on the lakes on the Rovuma river floodplain.
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Plate 7. Fish is bartered for food products e.g . maize, and is transported across the border to Tanzania.
In this picture, a person sits on a bag of maize and smaller bags are placed in the buckets.
Plate 8. Plant parts e.g. fruits, constitute a well used resource for fish poisoning.
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Plate 9. Dug-out canoes, are the most used fishing craft on the rivers (both in the Messinge-Rovuma-
Lucheringo River Systems) .






his research was constructed on the hypothesis that the fishery was originally conducted in the
ontext of common property and that this has changed to open access. The forces driving this
hange were postulated as colonisation, religion (christianity) which accompanied colonisation
nd growing monetary economies, especially in neighbouring Tanzania (Figure 4.2) . These forces
re considered to operate through disruption of local governance which was not replaced
ffectively by the colonial government. The result has been a breakdown in community-based
nanagement of the fishery and the opening of access to all, with little or no control.
nterviews with people from the study area and from government and non-government
organizations were used to :
assess justification for postulating community-based fishery management pnor to
colonisation;
gain understanding ofwho constitute the community of users;
elucidate the forces which have shaped the fishery;
• determine whether the fishery can be characterised as open access;
determine the role of government, or the lack thereof, in shaping the fishery up to the
present ; and
• assess the prospects for government acting as the lead 'agent of change' for the
reinstatement of CBNRM;
6.2 Evidence for common property management
The process of change from common property to open access is postulated to have taken
generations. Thus, ifthere is to be evidence ofthe fishery operating as a common property system
it is likely to be found in the recollections of community elders. The elders experience more
accurately the breakdown of traditions and the erosion of power base than the young. This is
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particularly so since the war of liberation (1964) and the subsequent civil war saw many of the
young adults grow up in a disrupted society and in neighbouring Tanzania. It is hence expected that
the young would not have strong experiences or even know about how the fisheries used to be
managed .
The interviews with the ten key informants provide an historical perspective. Responding to a
question about ownership offish in the past, seven ofthe ten said the fish belonged to the people .
They said that because ofcontrols exercised by the elders it was easy to monitor who was fishing
and to regulate access by people from outside the community. They emphasised that the chief
designated where fishing could occur and who could fish.
When asked how fishing was performed, four of the ten responded by saying that fishing was
performed in a group and the chief determined this (Figure 6.2 .1). They elaborated that people
from outside of the community had to approach the chief for permission to fish and if such
permission was granted, he would specify where and when this could occur. These fishermen









i ndivl du al ty In a gro up both
fish ing
Figure 6.2.1 Histogram showing how fishing was performed in the past (responses, in
frequency numbers) .
These respondents pointed out that in the past, groups offishermen would have 'exclusive rights '
to fish a particular area. This might be a floodplain lake, a channel or a stretch of shoreline.
Location was selected according to accessibility and availability of fish.
60
One informant noted that in the past the chiefwas respected as he was responsible for maintaining
order and justice. As most chiefs were also ' involved with rituals ' failure to comply could bring
bad lack in fishing and perhaps even more serious misfortune. This latter view was also advanced
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Figure 6.2.2 Histogram showing the chiefs role in relation to use of fisheries in the past
(responses, in frequency numbers) .
Common property resource management is characterised by clear distinction ofa 'group ofusers '
to whom the 'property' is common; rules which govern access to and use of the property
(resource); and an administration system. In the minds of the key informants there was a clearly
defined group ofusers/owners.The people in the domain ofa chief, owned and used the resources.
The user group was, however, not restricted to members of the chief s people; people from
elsewhere, including from across the river (Tanzania) could access the resource . This basic
acknowledgement ofthe rights ofpeople from ' the other side ofthe river ' provide a complicating
factor in introduction of CBNRM by the present government. This will be elaborated later.
The key informants recollect clearly that there were effective controls (Figure 6.2.2). Some of
these were tangible e.g. designation of an area and who could fish there; others were intangible,
being based on superstition. They also recollect a time when there was a firm administration by





















Figure 6.2.3 Histogram showing the recollection of the chiefs role over pre-colonial,
colonial and the period after independence (responses, in frequency numbers) .
It is reasonable to conclude that the fishery was a common property system. That there are still
recollections of this is important because the present government can be perceived as
reintroducing CBNRM and not introducing something which is totally new.
6.3 Forces promoting change
Introduction
Inherent in Figure 4.2 , is the postulate that the fishery has changed from a common property to an
open access system. This is thought to have occurred in response to a number offorces which have
caused progressive breakdown in group identity, regulations (including norms and values) and
administration. In this section the responses ofthose interviewed is used to assess this hypothesis.
Colonialism
Figure 4.2 in Chapter 4, implicates colonialism as one of the major forces directing change from
a fishery based on common property to one that allows open access to resources. From the arrival
ofthe colonists in the late 1800's, there was an attempt to introduce western cultures and to vest
ownership ofresources in the state (anon., 1999). It is postulated that this resulted in weakening
oftraditional cultures and values , as well as the weakening oftraditional authority. With weakened
traditional authority,.there would be a tendency to decreasing respect, confrontational attitudes and
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breakdown ofcontrols over people and resources that they used . This would result in open access
to these resources, particularly if a growing economy created a rising demand for the resources.
In Mozambique and other countries like Malawi, the history ofmanagement systems offisheries
resources traces two important periods (IDPPE, 1999a), the colonialism era and post-colonialism
era.
In the colonial era, there are no references to the existence ofa consistent or specific institutional
board for management offisheries (IDPPE, 1999a). This implies a continuing role for traditional
authorities. The government's role in management of fisheries resources was only through the
issuing offishing licenses and supervision by the government institutions in coordination with the
local chiefs. This effectively divided responsibilities and authority.
The government licensing process determined access to resources and not the traditional tribal
' licensing process' . That this was in ' co-ordination' with chiefs indicates clearly that there was
an intended shift in authority from the community to government. Inevitably this would be
accompanied by changes in attitudes ofpeople to local authorities and to use ofresources as will
be shown later. This is especially so since, as indicated above, government's ability to effect the
controls had been weak as there did not appear to be properly constituted institutions to do so.
Religion
When asked to indicate whether the introduction ofnew religions, particularly during the colonial
period , influenced the relationships between people, social ties and the manner in which people
use resources, four of the ten key informants (40%) responded positively .
When probed further they explained that this was one ofthe reasons that most ofthe people who
were born and grew up during that time, can not write or speak the official language (Portuguese) .
They said there was a fear that one could be taken to prison and by not being able to speak
Portuguese one could not express opinions . They mentioned that this was one way of trying to
escape from eating pork meat which is forbidden in Muslim religion, and consequently to resist
changing their religion from Muslim to Christianity.
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Seven respondents explained that ~esistance was founded in their religious commitment to not
eating pork. This was so strong that many would not attend school. With resistance came a
weakening of the local society, values and norms and the tendency to decreasing respect,
confrontational attitudes, and breakdown of controls. With weakened local society, there was a
breakdown in CBNRM and opportunities arose for open access to fisheries resources (Figure 4.2).
Culture
When asked what else they thought has also changed among people over time, seven ofthe ten key
informants responded that culture has also changed. They attributed this to the influence of new
cultures from outside which were adopted by local people, particularly during the colonial period .
Sixteen of the forty six who fish supported this view .
On further enquiry, they also indicated that the change in culture among people occurred not only
with the introduction ofnew cultures during colonial period but also, during the time ofwar when
people were forced to move from one area to another and from Mozambique to another country
(Tanzania) . They met different people, with different forms ofliving and relationships among them
and with the resources that they use. People became more adapted to these in order to survive in
these particular areas . And, since they adopted these, they brought them back when they returned
to Mozambique.
During conversation, one of the ten key informants mentioned that some of the natural disasters
such as droughts are due to ancestral anger and judgement, resulting from the marked , deliberate
move from adhering to the former cultural practices and societal values.
Attitude
Asked about what elsethey thought that has changed among people, all ten ofthe ten key informants
responded that the attitude ofpeople has changed over time. Only halfofthose who are involved
in fishing identified changes in attitude.
All of the key informants also mentioned that in the past, particularly during colonial period and
more recently during the period ofwar when most people were forced to move out ofthe country,
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in this case Tanzania, people have undergone a dramatic shift in attitude and thinking in respect
of traditional methods and practices and use ofnatural resources (fisheries). They said people no
longer respect their chiefs in the community; and since they have come back from the refugee areas
in Tanzania, the former N'dunas behave like Mwenyes (chiefs) and are now regarded as Mwenyes
in the community. This indicates a fragmentation and breakdown oftraditional social structures.
Fishermen from outside the area particularly Tanzania, do not respect local authority; therefore
they do not ask permission or report to the local authority when fishing outside their country or
area, as it used to be in the past. This change ofattitude indicates progression towards open access
to the fish resources.
This change may reflect that most people who are involved in fishing are young (Figure 6.2.4).
About halfofthese are less than thirty years ofage and a quarter are less than 25 years old. These
people have known little other than war and displacement. Consequently, they may not know
exactly how people related to each other and what protocols were supposed to be followed in
relation to the use ofnatural resources. This also suggests that the authority oftraditional chiefs,
which to some extent regulated fisheries in the past , had dramatically weakened as new social
structures (e.g. N'dunas becoming Mwenyes) developed under the influence ofcolonization and
war .
When talking to chiefMalingalile, known as the "Sultan" ofthe area, that is the chiefofthe chiefs,
he observed that:
'The former traditional structures are now eroded and where they still exist, people do
not adhere to them as it was the case in the past. Most ofthe powers which were vested
on these traditional chiefs have also been taken over by the modern system of living.
Those who were formerly N'dunas, seconding the chief (Mwenye) ofa given area, are
now also regarded as Mwenye. He also indicated that in contemporary time, the chiefs
role revolves only around social mediation (to intervene with social problems) , but in
terms of natural resources use (fisheries) and its allocation, this responsibility is
handled by the government (District Directorate of Agriculture and Fisheries and
Conservation Agency), which they do very little in terms of their legal provision and








Figure 6.2.4 A Pie chart depicting the age structure (percentage) of the people (n = 46) involved
in fishing, interviewed during the study.
Economy
Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in Africa (Maughan-Brown, 1998). This has been
exacerbated by many years of internal strife. Remote rural areas with poor infrastructure and
services are home to amongst the poorest people.
Tanzania, which borders the study area, has practically ' settled down' since it achieved
independence. Whilst it is still a very poor country in relative terms, it is much more wealthy than
the neighbouring part ofMozambique. There appear to be higher levels ofdisposable income in
Tanzania than in nearby Mozambique. This gains support from fishermen, most ofwhom (three of
the four who indicated that they process/sell fish) mentioned that they dispose of(sell and/barter)
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their fish to people from Tanzania. On further enquiry they elaborated saying that local people have
neither money nor goods to exchange for fish.
Twenty six of those who fish stated that increasing numbers of people from Tanzania were
harvesting fish in Mozambique; and twenty of these observed that fish stocks and catches were
declining and that technologies such as gill nets and poisons were being adopted. Four people who
process fish (smoking) were interviewed. Three of these stated that most their fish is purchased
by traders from Tanzania. One interviewee observed that there are fewer fish than in the past and
this causes problems because fish has to be kept longer before being taken to the market and
quality deteriorates (Plate 1). He also mentioned that the use ofpoisons spoils the quality of fish
and suggested that fishermen should be told not to use poisons.
This evidence points clearly to markets in Tanzania driving change in the fishery. Entry of new
and more people indicates breakdown in group coherence and introduction of technologies and
practices identified by the two respondents to be deleterious, elaborates breakdown of controls
and administration systems . It can be concluded that the market is a contributing factor in directing
change in the fishery from common property to open access .
6.4 Evidence for open access
Open access systems are characterised by ineffective or absence ofregulations, including both the
regulations and the administration thereof This results in a breakdown ofthe 'user group ' so that
anyone can access the resource, and each individual decides where, when and how to use the
resource and how much to harvest.
The interviews with both key informants and fishermen (Appendices 1 and 2) provided a number
ofinsights : Responding to a question about whether the former organizational structures were still
effective, all ofthe ten key informants responded negatively . When asked further about what they
thought the reasons were for the breakdown of these traditional structures, six blamed it on the
legacy ofcolonial administration and war (after-independence). They said that during the colonial
administration, structures were set up which undermined the local traditional institutions in regard
to the power that they were given under traditional organization systems.
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When asked about what they thought has changed in relation to control and regulation, all key
informants responded that currently there are no control systems regulating use ofthe resource; of
forty- six of those who fish, forty-three (93%) responded similarly. They said in the past,
particularly during the colonial period, the colonial government set up administrative structures
that undermined the local traditions and practices; and more recently , during war time when people
fled out ofthe country (e.g. to Tanzania), there has been a dramatic shift in attitude and thinking in
respect to traditional methods and practices. They said people no longer respect the traditional
rules and regulations governing the use and access to fisheries . They elaborated saying people no
longer seek permission from the chief, and non-traditional methods such as use of chemical
products (e.g. pesticides) have been introduced with the purpose of maximizing the fish catch .
When asked to indicatewhat effects the new administrative structures have, four of the ten key
informants indicated that they had changed the traditional institutions which regulated resource
use in the past. Modern institutions are now developed in line with a western type ofgovernance.
They indicated that even whe re traditional institutions still exist, people do not adhere to them as
was the case in the past. Most of the powers which were vested on these traditional institutions
have been taken over by the modern systems ofgovernance. One of the ten key informants also
indicated that the power and influence ofchiefs is currently limited to mediation. He elaborated
by saying that control over use of natural resources is now the responsibility of the government.
He commented that as the regulatory power shifted from local institutions to government, it was
accompanied by centralization ofcontrol. All ten key informants mentioned that people's attitude
towards fisheries has now changed from seeing fish as a resource vital for survival to seeing
fishing as an open access requiring venture capital.
When asked what implications these attitudinal changes havehad within the community and toward
fisheries, three ofthe ten key informants claimed the attitudinal change resulted from the lack of
controls. They said that because everybody minds his own survival and his 'pockets' , people
focus on self-interest and this situation has led to the overall erosion of cultural identity of the
community and group ownership over the resource. They felt that the intrusion offoreign practices
(pesticide/chemical poisoning by people from outside the areas) has also impacted local traditions
and practices negatively.
Three ofthe ten key informants mentioned that, after war, when people came back from the refugee
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camps in Tanzania, those who had been N'dunas behaved like Mwenyes, and are now regarded
as Mwenyes in the community. When asked further, why the N'dunas behave like Mwenyes three
key informants said that there was dispute over power as well as areas of settlements after
returning from Tanzania. They said this was because some ofthe N 'dunas did not want to go back
to their original places and therefore they settled wherever they wished to . In so doing they could
gain more power. This redistribution of power has affected traditional authority and fractured
society with a resulting weakening oftraditional norms and values, and organizational structures.
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CHAPTER 7
PROSPECTS FOR INTRODUCTION OF CBNRM
7.1 Introduction
Reversal of the trend from open access to common property resource management requires
intervention. Government intervention is necessary. The likely success of such intervention
depends as much on the willingness of the people to change as it does on the preparedness of
government to act as an ' agent of change ."
In this Chapter the prospects for successful transformation to CBNRM are considered.
7.2 Willingness of local people
Evidence presented in Chapter 6 indicated that some local people, particularly the elders, have
recollections of the fishery as a common property system. Thus, government would not be
introducing a foreign concept; rather they would be returning control to "people" who used to
exercise it, and reinforcing their accountability for so doing. Social changes which have occurred
in the interim are directing establishment of new institutions for resource management.
Ifpeople were satisfied with the present situation it would complicate transformation to something
else. The interviewees were asked to respond to a number ofquestions which would indicate their
level of satisfaction with the status quo.
Asked to indicate what changes have occurred in relation to fisheries resources, all ten ofthe key
informants stated that fisheries have declined over time. Forty-three out offorty-six ofthose who
fish, confirmed this view.
On enquiry whether the fishermen migrate from one area to another, thirty-eight of the forty six
responded positively. When asked further about the reasons for migration, they mentioned that they
do migrate because they have to follow the fish availability. When asked how many days they
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spend on a fishing trip, half of the forty-six (50%) fishermen, mentioned that this can take ten to
fifteen days, particularly in the dry season.
When investigated further, six of the ten key informants indicated that currently there are many
more fishermen from outside than from the local communities; Thirty-eight of forty-six people
involved in fishing supported this view.
When asked about the type of gear used they mentioned that gill nets, poison plants, hooks and
more frequently fishing traps were used in the rivers . Allforty-six fishermen mentioned that poison
plants (e.g. fruits, Plate 8), were more frequently used during the dry season on the lakes.
Furthermore, more than half of the fishermen, thirty-one of the forty-six, mentioned that fish
poisoning involves the use of chemicals (pesticides) which according to them, are from abroad
(Tanzania). Fifteen ofthese mentioned that acid fluids from car batteries were also used by people
from outside the area e.g. Macaloge and Unango.
Asked about the problems experienced in fishing, thirty-one ofthe forty-six (67%) people involved
in fishing mentioned that competitionwith other fishermen was the major problem. Fifteen ofthese
went on to state that the attitude ofusers fromoutside the area (e.g. Tanzania, Macaloge, Unango)
was also a problem. They said that the attitudes ofusers from outside was bad because they were
responsible for most fish poisoning, particularly the use of chemicals and acid fluids. They also
observed that fishermen from Tanzania do not respect fishing areas on the Mozambican side.
When asked whether there were ways in which the current situation could be improved, thirty-
three of forty-six of those who fish (72%), said that the creation of local committees and eo-
management offisheries could be the solution. Thirteen of forty-six (28%)mentioned that going
back to older systems through support oftraditional controls could also be one way in which the
current situation could be improved.




a breakdown of traditions;
a breakdown of controls;
an adoption of inappropriate technology;
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• an over-exploitation and foreign exploitation of the resource (fish);
an open access to resource;
• an awareness ofthe current situation and problems affecting the resource/fishing areas; and
a readiness to change (the situation) towards a desired/preferred management system
(Figure 4.1).
The call for reinstatement of controls, and greater involvement of the traditional authorities
conform with the intention ofgovernment. It can be concluded, therefore, that the local people are




In the post-colonial period, the government started to establish reforms to reinforce the sector.
New government institutions for management and administration offisheries were established and
legislation was revised so as to legalize the authorities of these institutions.
This period in Mozambique saw the establishment ofthe Economic Exclusive Zone (ZEE) , the
creation of the National Directorate of Fisheries (DNP) ,which is the institution responsible for
fisheries, the integration ofthe whole fisheries sector in the Ministry ofAgriculture and Fisheries
in 1994 (Figure 7.3), and the elaboration ofthe Master Plan for Fisheries. After restructuring took
place in 1994, the structure for fisheries sector was as follows :
• The National Directorate of Fisheries (DNP) . This is the institution responsible for the
fisheries sector including licensing, inspecting and management of fisheries. At the
provincial level the DNP is represented by the Provincial Services for Fisheries
Administration (SPAPs) ;
The Institute for Development of Fisheries of Small Scale (IDPPE). This is responsible
for socio-economic and technological research, for identification of projects and other
forms of development;
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The Institute for Fisheries Investigation (lIP), responsible for investigation and evaluation
of fisheries resources.
In 1994 the Commission for Fisheries Administration (CAP) was established to assess and advise
the minister ofAgriculture and Fisheries on aspects related to the regulations/rules, management
and conservation of fisheries resources. The commission is comprised of the representatives of
the institutions related with the administrative issues (DNP) , fisheries investigation (lIP and
IDPPE), artisanal fisheries, semi-industrial and industrial fisheries. It meets four times a year
(IDPPE, 1999a) .
In Mozambique, as in countries such as Malawi for example (IDPPE, 1999a), the resource
management regimeswere centralizedbefore the introduction ofeo-management programmes. The
State was responsible for formulation and implementation oflaws, regulations and other control
measures. In both cases (formulation and implementation of management plans) there are no
references about the existence ofspecific local structures responsible for managing the resources
(fisheries) in such a way to increase the productivity and reduce the risks ofthe fishing operations.
There is also no evidence for this on the Rovuma.
Factors such as the reduction of fish production index, 36 321 in 1987 to 19 195 in 1993,
(IDPPE, 1999a) ; the intensive use ofinappropriate fishing gear harmful to resources and habitat;
the aggravated conflicts between the users, and the lack of closed seasons for fish reproduction
purposes were some ofthe factors that indicated the difficulties faced by the Central Government
and the need for revision of policy for management of fisheries resources. This provided a
motivation (for new models for intervention based on involvement of local communities in the
management of fisheries resources through a eo-management approach (IDPPE, 1999a).
In Mozambique the eo-management programme started in 1995.It resulted from the evaluation of
the management systems for fisheries resources carried out during the preparation ofthe current
Master Plan for Fisheries Management (PDP) (Falcao and Hilario, pers. comm. 1999).
The evaluation concluded that the management systems for fisheries resources in force at the time
were inadequate and ineffective. It noted a tendency of increasing incidents of over-fishing,
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violation offishing areas, the use of inappropriate fishing technique and fishing crafts that are not
recommended by fisheries policy and legislation. As a strategy for minimization of these
problems, the Master Plan for Fisheries (PDP) recommends adoption of systems of eo-
. management, whereby responsibilities are shared between the government authorities and the
local communities (Falcao, pers . comm. 1999).
Policy
According to the Fisheries Policy (DecretolDecree no. 17/96), the intention is to integrate the
fisheries activities into the objectives of the economic development of the country and the
programme of the government in order to achieve:
• food security;
sustainable economic growth;
• reduction of unemployment rate; and
reduction of poverty;
The Fisheries Policy has the following sectoral objectives:
improve the internal supply of fish to cover part of the food shortages in country;
increase the generated foreign exchange by the sector;
• improve the living conditions of the fishing communities;
To achieve these objectives the Fisheries Policy addresses the following principles:
the fisheries resources are State property. The State has the responsibility to ensure that
the fishing activities do not endanger the sustainabilityofthe resource and that the benefits
from this activity to the country are maximized;
the fishing harbours of Maputo, Beira, Quelimane and Angoche, and other related
infrastructures are State property. The State has responsibility for achieving its
development in time and space in accordance with the needs ofthe productive sector and
the framework that ensures the long term sustainable investment;
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The role of the State in the implementation of the Fisheries Policy is as follows :
manage fisheries resources and promote of fishing activities;
• regulate and control the productive activities;
• provide an enabling environment to encourage private initiatives and establish mechanisms
and incentives for the development of productive activities;
provide public services concerning licensing, supervision and control of the fishing
activities;
• generate income through collection of specific fees by concession of licenses for fishing
practices and complementary activities.
Since Mozambique was colonised by Portuguese, it imported most ofits fish from Angola, which
was also a Portuguese colony . Local fisheries did not therefore, receive the formal attention ofthe
government (Saluda, 1997 in Namanha, 1999). Fisheries developed autonomously with little or
no control. With independence in 1975, came restrictions onimportation of fish from Angola .
Attention focused on local fisheries . The emphasis was, however, on marine and estuarine
fisheries. Inland fisheries continued largely uninfluenced by the government. Companies , known
as "EQUIPESCA" were established to exploit the fish and other marine resources, particularly
prawns (Saluda, 1997 in Namanha, 1999). The National Secretariat of Fisheries, set up by the
socialist government, developed policies and regulations, but the focus was on control and
harvesting. Inspection was the regulatory system. There was no attempt to constitute an integrated
management system until 1998.
The Fisheries Management Plan known as "Programa de Gestao das Pescarias Artesanais" focuses
on improving the supply the fish to internal markets and improving quality oflife. It is reasonable
to envisage that in the absence of enforcement of sustainable harvest levels, this could lead to
unsustainable harvesting of the resource.
The proposed management plan does , however, also state that the political and economic
objectives ofthe government are to ensure conservation offisheries while optimising the economic
benefits. Social, other than economic (in a narrow sense) benefits, are not implicitly recognised.
However, the policy directs towards eo-management offisheries, along the lines ofCBNRM. This {
could secure the flow of social benefits associated with the fishery (Namanha, 1999).
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According to IDPPE the government objectives are:
• to conduct socio-economic research and implement biological base-data collection to
provide base information so that local communities will be enabled to manage fisheries
resources based on the local initiatives.
to promote formation of artisanal eo-management committees in the areas exhibiting
indications of over-fishing.
to establish policy and legal framework for fisheries and institutions based on harmonising
formal and informal fisheries i.e. establishment of fisheries management.
to improve fisheries conflict management occurring within fishery resource areas.
• to improve communication betweenfisheries administrative institutions and personnel such
as researchers and communities using the fish resource in the fisheries areas (IDPPE,
1999b).
• for the implementation of the fisheries eo-management programme, the National
Directorate of Fisheries suggests the following immediate activities :
. • to train and enhance capacity of the government officers in fisheries resource
evaluation and socio-economic research;
• to enhance capacity and mobilize communities ill resource evaluation and
. dialogues among communities and institutions;
• to establish data-base collection system;
• to establish functional eo-management systems.
In the 1999 seminar, it was declared that, until the date that the Master Plan is established and
published, fisheries management will be based only 'on a licensing system and prohibition of
fishing especially along the coastal zones (IDPPE, 1999a). The emphasis on inland fisheries is not
particularly strong.
. Preparation offisheries management plans at present includes two components:
• Socio-economic and biological research, and
Formation of "local Fisheries Management Committees" (IDPPE, I999a), which would




Although the Government recogruzes the participation of local communities III fisheries
management inthe country, there isverylittlethat hasbeendoneto developlegislative support for
this. Therefore, the institutional structuresthat havebeenpromoted (Co-management committees)
are functioning informally and without any specific legal institutional status (Falcao and Hilario,
pers. comm. 1999). Co-management of fisheries is defined as the sharing of responsibilities,
authorityandcompetencybetweenthe government(fisheries researchand administration) andthe
users of the resources (private sector and the communities) in the management and control of







The legislation for administration of fisheries in Mozambique establishes that this must
be based on a 'sectoral andverticalvision' of the organizational structures and functions
in which responsibility is centered.
In relation to sustainable development of fisheries resources, it is up to the MAP to
approve the development plans related to the type of fisheries, however, this needs to be
doneinconsultationwiththe social, economicandprofessional groups concernedwiththe
fisheries activities (Artigo 6 and 7 do Regulamento das Pescas, Decreto 16/96 de 28 de
Maio). The way in which participative management for artisanal fisheries development is
integrated in the planning process is stillnot formalised.
In relation to process regulating access to fisheries resources, the fisheries law makes it
obligatory that fishing activities and the associated operations of artisanal fishermen be
licensed (Lei das Pescas, 1990).
Inrelationto conservationandmanagement offisheriesresourceswithparticularreference
to artisanal fisheries, the MAP has the following competencies (Artigo 35, idm.):
• to prescribe schemes to limit access to fisheries and fishing efforts;
define closed seasons (e.g. periods when fishing is not permitted);
prohibit inappropriate fishing methods;
prohibitand regulatefishing practicesto marinemammals andother protected and
•
rare species;
determine other conservation measures needed for the preservation of fisheries
resources;
• The fisheries law prohibitsthe use of explosive materials or toxic substances to facilitate
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the capture, weaken or kill fish species (Lei das Pescas 1990).
The eo-management ofmarine fisheries resources with respect to artisanal fisheries has never been
the specific object of legislation in Mozambique (Fabiao , pers . comm. 1999) . Only in terms of
Fisheries Policy and Strategy for Implementation, appro ved by the Resolucao no. 11/96 de 28 de
Maio , it is expressed as the Government Policy to establish "Co-management systems with direct
involvement ofcommunities in the definition and control ofapplication ofregulatory measures for
fisheries activity" .
Rules for supervision applicable for artisanal fisheries :
• The supervision offisheries activities in jurisdictional waters ofMozambique is centrered
on the MAP . It can delegate to the other organs ofthe state responsibility to perform these
functions (Lei das Pescas 1990). The regulations ofMarine Fisheries, define explicitly that
the ' fishing supervisor' can be a staffrnember ofthe Ministry ofAgriculture and Fisheries,
at professional level of fish supervisor, or any other person with legal authority may
supervise the fulfilment ofthe requirements established by the fisheries legislation (Article
2, no. 2 u) do Regulamento da Pesca Maritima, Decreto 16/96 de 28 de Maio) .
• The Law for Forestry and Wildlife (DNFFB) states clearly the possibility for the
supervision to be carried out also by legally designated supervisors, community agents,
within the regulatory terms ofits own portofolio (Lei de Florestas e Fauna Bravia, 1999)
Management Strategy
According to the implementation strategy ofthe fisheries policy, the management and supervision
of fisheries would be driven through the implementation of the following actions:
Regulation and establishment ofrestrictions to fisheries activity for the areas ofmarine and
inland waters and/or for populations of aquatic species, justified by:
- interest for conservation of aquatic and environmental living resources;
- objectives of economic efficiency for resource exploitation;
- protection of the economic position of the groups that perform the fishing
activities.
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regulation of fisheries based on biological evidence and economic justification, through
discussions with interested economic operators;
promotion of community involvement for management of aquatic resources and their
respective exploitation, so as to facilitate the introduction of natural resource utilization
patterns which are biologically sustainable and socio-economically efficient.
• promotion for development of fisheries activities with emphasis on fish production in
marine and inland fisheries with the aim of supplying the internal market ;
• promotion of development of aquaculture in marine and inland fisheries;
supervision and control of fishing activities through:
- utilization of vessels based in the main fishing harbours for inspection;
- boarding of inspectors in the fishing vessels ;
- guaranteeing the presence of fish inspectors in the more vulnerable zones, for
systematic control of infringements with particular reference to border zones of
Cabo Delgado, Maputo and Niassa;
- establishment ofmore efficient systems ofcommunication between land and sea;
- establishment control and monitoring systems for sport fishing activity;
- creation of regulations and appropriate inspection systems for inland fisheries
with particular emphasis to Lakes Niassa and Cahora Bassa in Tete;
- active participation and action in marine and inland fisheries supervision and
multi-ministerial competence;
inspection and guarantee of quality of fish products through:
• the inspection and certification of the quality;




the provision of required laboratory analysis services by the industrial
fisheries;
the creation ofregulations and control systems for quality to be maintained
by the fisheries industry.
Institutional capacity (IDPPE, lIP, DNP)
In Mozambique the programme of eo-management consists of two main components:
• one related to conducting the required socio-economic and biological studies , to be carried
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out by the Institute for Development ofSmall Scale Fishing (IDPPE) in coordination with
~
the Institute for Investigation of Fisheries (lIP); and a secondly
• that of promoting forums known as eo-management committees, for coordination and
implementation of recommendations from research.
There are three pilot project areas in the Provinces ofNampula, Zambezia and Inhambane.
According to Fabiao (pers . cornm. 1999) there are three functioning eo-management committees.
One in NampulaProvince (Districts ofAngoche, Moma and Mogincual) integrated in the Project
ofArtisanal Fishing in Nampula (PPAN) and two in Inhambane Province (Districts ofVilankulos
and Inhassoro) . The eo-management committee of the area of the PPAN is distinguished from
others mainly because it functions in coordination with small committees based in the fishing
centres, known as local committees. There are 17 local Committees (Fabiao, pers . cornm. 1999).
According to him, although they are in their infancy, they have been contributing progressively to
the control of fishing activities; to consolidation of social relationships between the artisanal
fishermen in the zones of their influence; gradual reduction of the rate ofutilization of mosquito
nets for fishing and of conflicts between artisanal fishermen in the area ofPPAN; to the marking
and subsequent release into the water ofapproximately 55 turtles ; and to the introduction ofthe ban
for lobster in Inhambane. These are considered good examples that illustrate the type of actions
and the outcome of the management programme in the pilot areas (IDPPE, 1999b).
The persistence of certain problems, as referred to by the artisanal fishermen in the synthesis
report (IDPPE, 1999b), have been constituting the major obstruction for the effectiveness of the
eo-management programme for fisheries resources in Mozambique. These problems can be
classified into four main groups, namely:
• Legal
The lack of legal support of the eo-management committees does not allow a clear
definition of their role and competency.
• Financial
Although the committees have been increasing efforts to create an autonomous financial
system (e.g . collection offees for issuing offishing permits to the migrant fishermen) for
their normal functioning, there are indications that this is not yet effective and secure .
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• Conflicts for operation
There is an on going problem ofviolation of areas for artisanal fishing by the industrial
fleet, mainly on the Sofala Bank. This issue is being discussed in various forums of
management in the pilot zone, but no decisive measures have been taken to minimize the
problem. According to IDPPE (1999b), data collected in the zone ofPPAN have shown
that the number cases of destruction of artisanal fishing gears by the industrial fleet have
remained the same.
• Institutional coordination
The weak coordination between the institutions ofthe sector, and between these and the
committees in the process ofimplementationofthe eo-management programme is reported
to be another restraint. According to the National Seminar Synthesis Report 1999, this
restraint had three dimensions :
- The relative absence in the sector of relevant institutions notably National
Directorate of Fisheries, Provincial Services for Fisheries Administration,
Provincial and District Directorates of Agriculture and Fisheries.
- The lack of an effective methodology and clear coordination between the
institutions of the sector that participate in the process; and
- The weak involvement ofartisanal fishermen of the pilot zones in the meeting of
the Fisheries Administration Commission (CAP).
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LEGEND: DINAGECA (National Directorate for Geographyand Cartography;DINA (NationalDirectoratefor
Agriculture; DNE (National Directorate for Rural Extension; DINAP (National Directoratefor Veterinary);
DNFFB (National Directorate for Forestryand Wildlife);DHNHA (National Directorate HydraulicAgriculture);
DNP (National Directorate of Fisheries); DE (Departmentof Economy); DRH (Department for Human
Resources); DCI (Department for InternationalCooperation); DAF (Departmentfor Administrationand Finance);
GMAP (Gabinet for the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries).
Figure 7.3 Organogram for the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, showing reporting
issues ( --) and linesC------) of communication and authority. Those departments
with special responsibilities for fisheries are shown in bold. DNP (National Directorate of
Fisheries).



















Figure 7.3.1 Organogram. for National Directorate ofFisheries, Ministry of Agriculture
and Fisheries.
Source: Direccao Nacional de Pescas
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Human Resources
According to the annual Report (IDPPE, 1998), up to 1998, the IDPPE had a total number of173
workers, from which 140 were national permanent staff, 29 temporary staff, and 4 were foreigners .
The staff component is presented in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3 Personnel ofIDPPE
DESIGNATION Head-Quarters Delegations Stations Total
1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998
~
Nationals




SUB· TOTAL (1) 63 57 90 103 28 9 181 169
Foreigners
Technicians
. Cooperation 4 4 4 - - - 8 4
. Volunteers
SUB - TOTAL (2) 4 4 4 0 0 0 8 4
TOTAL (1) + (2) 67 61 94 103 28 9 189 173
Source: IDPPE, 1998.
When talking to Gopole (pers . comm. 1999), working with the Department of Fisheries in
Lichinga, Niassa (Administration Sector), he mentioned that the department had seven members,
in the province . These include, the head ofthe Department, a representative for Inspection Sector
(a Veterinary Surgeon) and two Fish Inspe ctors, a representative ofthe administration sector, a
servant and one guard (Figure 7.3.2).
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PROVINCIAL SERVICES FOR AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES - DPAP, NIASSA
DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES
(Head of the Department - 1)
INSPECTION SECTOR
I
Veterinary Surgeon - (1)
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTOR
/ I \
Typist - (1) Servant - (1) Guard - (1)
Fish Inspectors (Fiscais) - (2)
\
Figure 7.3 .2 Staff of the Department ofFisheries, Provincial service for Administration of fisheries
in Niassa .
However, among the staffno one has undergone training in fisheries management. There is only one
staffmember who is holding a degree in Veterinary Science who works in the Inspection Sector. The
Department ofFisheries has no staff representatives at the district level.
From this, one can say that there is no clear understanding ofthe connection that should exist between
the District Directorate of Agriculture and Fisheries, (in this case Unango District), and the
\
Department ofFisheries at provincial level. This can also lead one to conclude that the co-ordination
between the Department ofFisheries and the District Directorate ofAgriculture and Fisheries is also
not clear.
Talking to the Director Directorate ofAgriculture and Fisheries in Unango district, he mentioned that
the Directorate ofAgriculture and Fisheries, had promoted the creation ofseven fisheries associations
in the villages, Table 7.3.2, to represent and co-ordinate fisheries activities at the village level. He
further mentioned that, four years have passed since the associations were created, but because of
lack of funds these have not made much progress (Rachide, pers . comm. 1999). Since these
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meetings , it is doubtful that these still exist.
Table 7.3.2 Village Fisheries Associations, Sanga District
Name of the village: Number of Associations:
Maombika 2
No va Madeira 2
IT-Congress 2
Matchedje 1
Source: (Mr Abdallah Rachid , pers. comm. 1999).
Infrastructure, transport and logistics
Mr Robert, who is the head of the Department of Fisheries-Lichinga, mentioned .that the
Department lacked statistical information and did not know exactly what is happening in most of
the rivers and lakes where fishing takes place, particularly in the northern part ofthe Province. He
stated that, since the department lacks transport and infrastructure in these areas, it becomes
difficult to travel. He further mentioned that the department has logistic problems and couldn't
even buy writing paper for the office (Robert, pers . comm. 1999).
The available funds to support the development of activities in 1998 where from two different
sources :The government budget (current and investment) andfrom externalfundsobtainedthrough
the International Cooperation, (IDPPE, 1998). According to IDPPE, the availability offunds from
the current government budget was 518.7 million Meticais (circular No. 2/RF-DAF/98 e da nota
No. 466/97/SEO-DAF/98) for the year 1998 and these were allocated to three different levels,
such as:
• Expenses for the personneL 282.7
• Expenses for Goods and Services 194
Other expenses 48
However, a total expenditure of600.8 million ofMeticais was incurred, corresponding to 16%
deficit of the total amount ofmoney that was provided. The expenditure breakdown is shown in
Table 7.3.3, below.
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Table 7.3.3 - Government budget and total expenditure, 1998 (million of Meticais):
EXPENSES Approved Am ount Real Expenditure Balance Percentage
Personnel 282 .7 + 2017 402 .5 0 142*
Other expenses with . 42 42 0 100
personnel
Goods and Services 194 156.3 40.7 81
TOTAL 538.7 600 .8 15.3 242
*The 13th salary not included, however this was paid III January, 1999.
Source : IDPPE, 1998.
Investment budget
The proposal for the investment budget for 1998 was 10,259 million Meticais, Only 7,743.4
million corresponding to 76% ofthe proposed budget was approved. From this amount, 2,087.4
million (27%) was from the government budget and this was allocated to the Project ofArtisanal
Fisheries in Nampula Province -PPAN, (PES/96/011) and 5,656 million (about 73%) through
income from the Fisheries Promotion Fund (FFP) and allocated according to the Projects for
Institutional Development (PES/96/020) and Management of Fisheries Resources with the
participation of fishing communities (PES/96/010), (IDPPE, 1998).
According to IDPPE (1998), ofthe total amount (3,450 million ofMeticais) provided by FFP for
investment, and 2,729 .2 million was spent, as shown in Table 7.3.4, as follows:
Table 7.3.4 FFP (Fundo de Fomento Pesqueiro) and total expenditure, 1998 (Million ofMeticais):
RUBRIC Provided Bud get Expenses Balance Percentage
Salaries and Wages
1591.4 1591.4 0 100
Other expenses for the
personnel 125.5 96.1 29.4 76.6
Goods 246 245 .7 0.9 99 .9
Services 1486.5 796 690 .6 53.5
Total 3450 2729.2 720 .9
(1) From the money that was presented III the Table above, are 10%.
Source: IDPPE, (1998).
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However , the real expenditure in 1998, is of3 ,520,646 US$, as shown in Table 7.3.5 below:
Entity Location Period Total Budget Real Expenditure1998
Cooperacao Irlandesa InhassorolNiassa 1997-98 221,000 112,179
Project SUO Inhaca 1998 60,615 60,615
IFAD AngochelMoma 1994-2002 6,020,000 1,734,705
OPEC AngochelMoma 1995-1999 2,000,000 1,527,089
Cooperacao
Espanhola Palma 1998-1999 487,500 82,692.3
Cooperacao Francesa




When considering the prospects for introducing CBNRM to the fishery the following conclusions
can be drawn :
• the community is ready for change. They are concerned about the state ofthe resource and
its use. They indicate a willingness to embrace CBNRM;
• whilst government has good intentions and has adopted appropriate policies, it is not well
prepared for introducing CBNRM. There are organisational and legislation weaknesses,





Community Based Natural Resource Management has three core components: one or more
resources, a definedcommunity; and management including structure and process (Figure 8.1).The
fishery in the study ar~a has changed from a common property resource use system to one ofopen
access . In this Chapter consideration is given to the implications for the introduction ofCBNRM
for the resource (fish), the community, management and transformation.
Community
_-----------------------+~Management
Figure 8.1 The core components ofCBNRM.
8.2 Community
Isar (1998) considering the relationship between culture, cultural conservation and development
observed:
'Today, the global organisation does not dream ofbuilding the local from the global . It must be the
other way around, and we must build the global from the local. Together we have to find the local
solutionsthat will then build upwards and across , through networks, governments and international
organisations, into global solutions. Or, to put it somewhat differently, in today's interconnected
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world order, the same principles and forums that make sense at the smallest scale; equity,
transparency, responsibility, practicality; also work at the largest scale. If there is to be a forum
for global governance and for all overarching intelligence to guide the world through the
challenges of the 21st century, it will surely embody these principles rather than looking like a
national government at large. '
A local solution to what appears to be unsustainable patterns of resource use requires a sense of
local identity, of belonging, in essence a sense of community. Matowanyika (1998) noted that:
'Recreating new landscapes that are in harmony with the real cultural and natural heritage and
realities of the region, is, therefore, a major challenge. It requires a clear understanding of the
issues and especially the social institutions. '
The persistence of social interactions is a prerequisite for a sense of community, for it is these
which bind the norms and values of people which, in turn, bond members of the community .
The term landscape implies a physical scale; so too does community, particularly when used in
a rural context because ' land is the motifthroughwhich a community's heritage ispassed from one
generation to the next ' (Maluleke, 1998). The rivers ofthe study area are dominant features ofthe
landscape and provide an important part ofthe physical template on which rural communities are
organised. It is the rivers and the resources they sustain (particularly fish) which drew people to
a common geographical focus . The 'catchment' from which these people are drawn is complex.
Perhaps in the pre-colonial era, before the political boundaries ofTanzania and Mozambique were
drawn, the resource users from north and south of the Rovuma river were one despite the
inexactness ofborder identities (Bunn and Auslander, 1998). Since then there appear to have been
periods of separation, consequent upon colonisation, 'unification' when people sought safety in
Tanzania; only to be followed by separation as people moved back to Mozambique.
The landscape has changed. The growing economy in Tanzania has provided a market for fish so
that people are drawn in increasing numbers towards the resource. This has blurred the physical
boundaries which defined the community ofusers. In so doing, it has contributed 'development'
which is' divorced from its human or cultural context' (Isar, 1998), and thereby has been a driving
force weakening culture and a sense of community.
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Intentional weakening oftraditional authorityand separationofpeople from resources through state
acquisition oftenure (Murombedzi, 1990; Gaborone, 1998) have been important determinants of
attitude and behaviour and the erosion ofculture worldwide (Bishop, 1998; Gaborone, 1998; Isar,
1998 and Vaalbooi, 1998) . This has also happened in the study area to the extent that there is
declining evidence of cultural cohesion.
It is clear that, at the present time, it would be difficult to define ' the community' in geographical
or cultural terms . Neither the physical nor the ' social' territories (Matowanyika 1998) are evident.
It is difficult to imagine how CBNRM can be introduced until the 'community of users ' can be
defined. This will be a major challenge given that the resource occurs at the interface between two
sovereign states, and there is a precedent ofuse which has been based on the premise that people
can cross borders and harvest resources as if they were the property of both states.
The definition of ' community' will be an important local step on which the broader scale picture
of sustainable resource use within the region can be built.
8.3 Resources
It is tempting to conceptualise the resource under consideration to be fish. This is too narrow.
There cannot be fish without water so the availability of water in time and space e.g. the
distribution ofwater in the landscape, cannot be separated from the distribution of fish. This, in
turn, determines the direction offishing effort in time and space; so land from which to access the
water and then the fish, and on which to establish fishing and processing camps becomes an
integral part of the necessary resource base . So too do materials required for construction of
camps, for processing (smoking), and for building boats/canoes.
The success or failure of the fishery is, therefore, contingent upon the sustainable supply of a
.comple~ ofresources. Some ofthese, particularly land and vegetation growing thereon, are easily
defined in space because of their ' fixed' nature. Others such as water and fish which vary
extensively in space and time, are not.
One can envisage CBNRM returning tenurial rights over land and vegetation. The state assumed
ownership ofall land and resources there on both during the colonial period and during the period
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of socialist rule after independence. The return of the land to the people in the study area could
bring and/or reinstate control over access to water, and thus to fish, and other resources required
to capture fish and process them so that they can be transported to distant markets. Ifindeed people
from further afield in Mozambique and Tanzania have established rights ofuse through precedents,
then servitude ofsome kind might have to be considered. There is some indication in the responses
ofthose interviewed that historically there may have been arrangements which allowed access by
people who were from 'outside the community.' It was recorded that such people would seek -,
permission from the Mwenye (Chapter 7).
The scarcity ofwater in southern Africa is such that river flow is increasingly regulated, and flow
is progressively decreased (Davies and Day, 1998). The urgency for achieving efficient, equitable
and sustainable use ofwater has resulted in water being regarded as an asset ofthe state. In some
countries legislation removes private ownership ofwater and replaces it with rights ofuse (South
African Water Act no. 36 of 1998) . It is probable that tenurial rights over land and water will be
quite different.
In 1998 South Africa introduced legislation governing the use ofmarine living resources (Marine
Living Resource Act no. 18 of 1999). Although the title of the Act refers to marine living
resources, it also considers the situation in estuaries. This Act designates these living organisms
as the property ofthe state and the state will regulate access and harvest. Although it is not quite
so explicit in legislation in Mozambican government it is evident that the intention of the
Mozambican government is to retain ownership ofmarine living resources and probably also fresh
water living resources (Regulamento da Pesca Maritima, Decreto 16/96 de 28 de Maio) . The
present system of licensing and inspection (Namanha, 1999, Chapter 5) indicates that,
notwithstanding intentions to promote CBNRM the state will retain ownership ofthese resources.
The community may be delegated for managing access and offtake.
This study shows that the resource situation is complex . It is probable that tenurial rights will be
different for different resources. Some of the resources e.g. water are nationally scarce and
resource allocation will increasingly be under the influence of national priorities; allocation of
others will be more under the influence oflocal priorities. But, since fish are intricately linked to
the supply of fresh water, management of use will have to consider the bigger picture of water
availability. Local solutions will have to be integrated into much larger national scale solutions.
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When it comes to the use of fish the' social landscape' (Matowanyika, 1998) extends far beyond
the local. This must inevitably impact on the definition and culture ofcommunities withwhom the
government intends to engage CBNRM.
8.4 Management
Management requires an organisational structure and a process. The complex nature of the
community and resource use system indicates that achieving effective community-based
management is critically dependent upon support at various levels ofgovernment. Reinstating some
. form of local management structures, and the sense of ownership which comes with regaining
authority over access to and use of resources, is not likely to be sufficient. Two factors are
important.
Firstly, the 'social landscape' has to be defined. This relates particularly to participation of
Tanzanians in the fishery in the future. National considerations are principal determinants of such
decisions and it is obvious , therefore, that whilst local considerations are important they are likely
to be secondary to the greater national considerations. Nevertheless, the organisational structure
must permit management of international relations at both national and local scales. The present
organisational structure shows a number of weaknesses in this regard. At the local level the
committees are constituted jointly by the Mozambique government and local (Mozambique)
citizens. There is no provision for formal interaction with resource users from Tanzania; There
also seems to be weakness in the organisational structure of the department of fisheries,
particularly at local level, where roles and responsibilities in respect of CBNRM are not clear.
Given the complex nature ofboth the ' community' and the resources it is evident that organisation
will have to be strengthened at the local level. Close collaboration between departments will be
necessary if a consistent philosophy and approach are to be expounded and if confusion is to be
minimised.
Secondly, the complexity ofmanaging a fishery ofthis nature to achieve sustainable use should not
be underestimated. This is especially so when it has to be transformed from what appears to be
a situation of open access and overutilisation, to one where access is regulated and, in all
probability, harvests (and therefore returns) are decreased. Since it is the intention ofgovernment
to introduce CBNRM, government is the' change agent.' Maughan-Brown (1998) and Namanha
93
(1999) have drawn attention to the importance of government being properly prepared for
intervention.
The findings ofNamanha (1999) who researched a fishery in Tete province, are confirmed in this
study (Chapter 5). Government has developed appropriate policy to facilitate introduction of
CBNRM and mechanisms for coordination are in place at higher levels of government. But
deficiencies exist in respect of fisheries policy, the legal basis to support CBNRM and in the
capacity to implement the process.
Due to the generally poor consideration given to inland fisheries in sectoral policies, the
effectiveness and implementation of policies is weak. Sectoral policies contain little mention of
inland fisheries and are uncoordinated in their coverage ofinternational issues (e.g. trans-frontier
policies). Regional initiatives on fisheries management, including the action plans and
international agreements addressing fisheries issues, are focussed more on assessment and
planning than on the ground implementation.
At national level, the sustainable use and management of river fisheries in the country is
undoubtedly constrained by policy weaknesses and omissions which together fail to present
adequate incentives for conservation of the resource. These include:
• weak integration of fisheries policy and legislation at national and international levels;
• multiple, uncoordinated and fragmented institutions, legislation and policies touching on
inland fisheries issues
• unclear policies in respect of private and community access and rights to inland;
poor and weakly enforced controls, and low penalties for activities contributing to inland
fisheries degradation (e.g. fish poisoning) .
This study and that ofNamanha (1999) have shown that government does not currently have the
capacity (members and expertise) that will be required to introduce CBNRM in river fisheries.
It is constructive to draw a comparison ofthe situation in Mozambique with that in Zimbabwe and
Namibia. The CAMPFIRE programme which started in Zimbabwe in 1986 was established to
enable local people to manage wildlife present in communal areas, and to retain benefits from the
use (consumptive and non-consumptive) such aswildlife. According to Katerere (1997) , 'the legal
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basis of resources supporting the objective of CAMPFIRE is the delegation of appropriate
authority for the management ofwildlife resources (which are under State ownership) to district
councils, as provided under the 1982 amendment to the Parks and Wildlife Act (1975). The
CAMPFIRE programmes also provide financial and technical support towards the development
offormalized management capacity within the participating communities, and operate under clear
principles of revenue distribution' .
He also, highlights two key problems with the CAMPFIRE programme:
• it is based on policy not law. The designation of appropriate authority status to district
councils is purely at the discretion of the Minister of Environment and Tourism, and the
further devolution of responsibility to ward and village-based wildlife management
committees is at the discretion of the district councils.
• the second problem relates to the institutional unit ofproduction (the community) . Tenure
insecurity and politically fragile applications of the appropriate authority mechanism
marginalizes communities in the management of their wildlife resources.
In contrast, Namibia has recently passed the Nature Conservation Amendment Act (1996) which
provides communal residents with direct rights over their wildlife resources, following the
registration ofa community conservancy. Registration ofa conservancy requires the community
in question to form a 'committee' to manage funds, and to have a 'constitution' stating the
objectives of the conservancy and defining its boundary. Namibia's new law provides for the
sustainable management and utilisation of game in communal areas and for members of the
community to derive direct benefits from such use and management.
The act has given local communities important legal status (Katerere, 1997). In this way Namibia's
conservancy programme addresses some of the shortcomings of current CBNRM initiatives in
southern Africa. In Namibia communities have moved from being mere'gate keepers' to becoming
'true resource managers' participating in planning and decision making. They have genuine' rights'
over their natural resources and 'control' how the resources are to be managed.
For the government ofMozambique to overcome the problems ofopen access towards fisheries
resources experienced in the study area and move to a desired management state (e.g. common
property resource), they must be prepared to have well-defined rights regimes in place. However,
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the endogenous (within the community) movement from open access to a desired state ofCBNRM
is not enough to reverse the trend to open access on the Rovuma river systems, because two
countries and different , heterogeneous groups of people are involved. Therefore, trans-frontier
coordinated management strategies involving the governments ofTanzania and Mozambique will
be required. Although current policies that direct towards eo-management of fisheries in
Mozambique; along the lines ofCBNRM programmes, are a necessary prerequisite so too is the
institutional framework accompanying the property rights structures the two countries.
8.5 Transformation
The transformation of the fishery from a common property system to one of open access has
occurred gradually over many years. This research has shown that the fishery has increasingly
become an economic activity, as market demands inTanzania create opportunities to engage a cash
economy. People's expectations ofwhat the fishery can provide have grown; and so too has their
dependency on it for meeting household requirements. There is also evidence that the fishery, as
it is currently practiced, cannot sustain the levels of harvest. A reduction of offtake is indicated.
This will be associated with a decline in disposable income amongst a people who are
desperately poor and who urgently require development opportunities. It is possible that
introduction ofCBNRM to the fishery will worsen the situation, unless it is accompanied by new
economic opportunities. If the fishery is to be brought back to sustainability it will have to be
viewed as one element of a development process directed at achieving a sustainable diversified
economy.
What are the relationships between CBNRM and development? The differences are fundamental.
CBNRM, as the name implies, addresses the management of one or more resources by a
recognisable group ofpeople. Management, in this context, can be defined as ' directing the use
of one or more resources. Development, on the other hand, can be defined as ' realising the
potential' , the latent potential, within the system (Geddie, 1996). Whilst CBNRM has had its
origins in endeavours to enable communities to realize the potential wealth ofwildlife resources,
in the case ofthe fishery this is already being done . What is required is better management ofthe
use of the resource. CBNRM is, consequently, an appropriate approach; the intention being to
alter the 'pattern ofuse' from one in which each individual makes decisions without concern for
the implications for other users or the state ofthe resource, to one in which decisions are made on
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the grounds of equity, efficiency and sustainability .
The introduction of CBNRM in the fishery will, however, not necessarily contribute to
development; it may have quite the opposite consequence. Should this occur, or be sensed by local
people to be a likely consequence of CBNRM, one can appreciate the likelihood ofresistance to
change. The implications are obvious. What is urgently required is a development strategy which
leads to the realisation of new potential; preferably potential which is substantially greater than
the likely reduction in potential consequent upon bringing the fishery to levels ofsustainable use.
Failure to successfully address development could easily result in CBNRM losing credibility, with
undesirable consequences.
Much of Africa ' s rural population desperately need development which leads to a sustainable
improvement in their quality of life. CBNRM is a sub-set of development; it cannot replace
development. It has more to do with a way of doing things (management) than it has to do with
realising potential (development). CBNRM should not be confused with development. Failure to
recognise and acknowledge the differences leads to attempts to introduce management processes
without giving due attention to the greater goal ofdevelopment. Fisheries appear to be inherently
different from 'wildlife ' , in that, by large, communities have retained access to them. Their use of
the resource has reflected the changing economy. By contrast people have been marginalised from
wildlife and by large their use of this resource has not reflected changes in the economy. Thus,
whilst introducing CBNRM for wildlife may introduce development, this is less so in fisheries.
This research focussed on the network between the wish ofthe government to introduce CBNRM
and the existing operation of a fishery. The findings indicate that in addition to a number of
problems reflecting the complexity ofthe fishery and the preparedness ofgovernment to act as the
agent for change, there is insufficient appreciation of the differences between introducing a new







Historical common property systems
The findings ofthis study indicatethat the fisheryused to operate under a common property regime.
This is based on evidence that :
• there was a strong sense of community;
• there were customary rules, ritual practices and restrictions placed on resource use
• traditional authorities were acknowledged and respected;
• beliefs, attitudes and behaviour patterns were strongly influenced by the sense of
community, superstitions and traditional authority.
Current open access systems
This study shows that the fishery presently operates as an open access system. This conclusion is
based on evidence that:
• traditional leaders have been progressively stripped of their authority and influence
(including those based on superstitions and rituals);
• government has had neither the resources nor the capacity to effect control;
• there is little or no control over access, harvesting levels and technology;
there is no sense ofa 'community ofusers';
• there is growing conflict amongst users. This is based on ongms of artisans and
technology.
Forces directing change
The research identifies a number of forces which have directed change. They originated at least
as far back as the period of colonisation, and they have been reinforced during the period since
independence by government policies and civil strife. Identified forces include:
government intervention weakening traditional authority;
government intervention promoting christianity (pre-colonial era) in place oflim;
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• new values, beliefs and attitudes, gained through greater and more prolonged mixing of
people from different communities, which have led people to either overtly (e.g. 'New'
chiefs) challenge traditional authority or covertly ignore customary rules and beliefs; and
• growing markets which drive exploitation of fish resources.
Satisfaction with the present situation
The findings ofthe study indicate key informants, artisans and government are concerned about the
present situation. These concerns are articulated around:
• the declining resource base (unsustainable use);
• the adoption of inappropriate technologies;
• the lack of protection of nursery areas;
• the declining respect;
• the lack of control;
• increasing numbers of artisans from Tanzania fishing in Mozambican waters; and
• capacity and resources to introduce CBNRM.
There is consensus that action should be taken to remedy the situation, with some suggesting a
return to community control i.e. the need to re-establish a common property system. Considerable
complexity presents the process ofredefining the' community ofusers' given historical precedence
of use by people from Tanzania.
Prospects
Evidence suggests that the resource base is declining. In the open access system which prevails,
one can reasonably anticipate growing competition for increasingly scarce resources. Conflict will
increase and likely become more intense.
There are strong memories of the fishery as a common property system and there is growing
concern about the present open access system. These are strong foundations on which to promote
change, but the system is shown to be very complex. There will be no quick, easy or cheap
solutions. A well considered, long term process (not a project) is required to bring about lasting
change. A strategic planning process which leads to preparation and implementation ofa business
plan, should be initiated as soon as possible. The changes which have to be brought about are
fundamental relating to the integration of social, economic and environmental sustainability.
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Recommendation
There are many recommendations which could be made addressing various issues (e.g. tenure , use,
and access) but, these are unlikely to make a difference at the scale required. Major intervention
is necessary. For this reason one recommendation is made here.
The single recommendation is that the government should acknowledge the complexity of the
situation and should establish a strategic planning process which leads to an implementable plan
with achievable objectives directed towards re-establishing:
• a sense of community;
• an institutional structure and capability which sustains the sense of community and
promotes management of use of resources; and
sustainable use of the spectrum of resources used in the fishery.
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. 1999 (SPFFB - DP AP/Niassa)
1999 (IUCN-Mozambique, Chipange Tchetu Projectt Coordinator)
1999 (INR, University of Natal, Research Project Coordinator)
1999 (IDPPE, Project Coordinator/Acting Director)
1999 (Department of Fisheries - DP AP, Niassa)
1999 (IDPPE - Maputo)
1999 (Head of Game scouts, SPFFB/Chipange Chetu Project,
Translator)
1999 (National Co-Director for Fisheries adminitration)
1999 (IDPPE - Maputo)
1999 (DNFFB, Community Natural Resource Management Unit)
1999 (DNFFB, CNRM Unit , Coordinator)
1999 (UGC/MICOA - Maputo)
1999 (Administrative Post of Unango/Sanga District, Niassa)
1999 (District Director for Agriculture and Fisheries)
1999 (Department of Fisheries, Niassa Province)
1999 (Provincial Director for Agriculture and Fisheries)
1999 (Head of Community Guards, translator)
Members of the Community:
1999 (Secretary of the Ward - Madeira Village/Sanga, Niassa)
1999 (Madeira Village - Sanga/Niassa)
1999 (Traditional ChieflMadeira Village - Sanga, Niassa)
1999 (Traditional Head Chief - Sanga/Niassa)
1999 (Traditional ChieflMatchedge - Sanga/Niassa)
1999 (Madeira Village - Sanga/Niassa )
1999 (Traditional ChieflMadeira Village - Sanga/Niassa)
1999 (Traditional ChieflMadeira Village - Sanga/Niassa)
1999 (Traditional Chief/Tulieke Village Madeira - Sanga/Niassa)
1999 (Lilumba Village - Macaloge/Sanga/ Niassa)
1999 (Tulieke Village, Madeira - Sanga/ Niassa)
1999 (A fisherwoman in Madeira Village - Sanga/Niassa)
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APPENDIX 1 Questionnaire addressed to key informants
Preamble:
I'm a student from the Centre for Environment and Development at UNP, South Africa, studying
about the situation of inland fisheries in this part of Niassa Province, northern Mozambique.
Concerning to your own experience and with particular reference to your own fishing areas, please
would you respond to the following questions? Comments are welcome, wherever appropriate.
Name of the village/fishing area------------------------------------------------------------------------
l.ocation------------------------------------~-------------------------------------------------------------
Date: -------/-------/1999
Number of Interviewees, n = 10; Responses are presented in figures according to respondents;
Q.1 How long have you been living here?
< 5 years 0 0
5 - 10 years 0 3/10
> 10 years 0 7/10




remained the same 0 0





Q.4 When did these changes occur?
pre-colonial time 0 0
colonial time 0 4/10
after independence 0 6/10
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Q.5 In your experience, how was in the past , fishing performed?
Done individually 0 36320
done in group 0 4110








Q.8 Do the local fishermen buy fishing licenses from the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries?
o
10110
Q.9 Please, give your opinion on the following? Access to fishing sites in Mozambique.
agree disagree
most fish caught is from the rivers 0 6110 0 0
most fish caught is from the lakes 0 4110 0 0
fish caught in rivers and lakes is 0 0 0 0
same
Q.IO Where are the people involved in fishing from?
many few
from the community 0 0 4110
from outside 0 6110 0
Q.l1 . What role do the chiefs play in the community, in relation to the use offisheries in their areas?
have nothing to do with it 0 10110
control people from outside 0 0
authorize fishing to outsiders 0 0
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Q.12 What role did the chiefs play in the community (in the past), in relation to the use of fisheries
in their areas?
Had nothing to do with it 0 0
control people from outside 0 3110
authorize fishing to outsiders 0 7110
Q. 13 Is the role of chief (Mwenye) more or less difficult during the following periods?
Grade: A= much more difficult; B= much more difficult; C= not difficult
A B C
pre-colonial 0 0 0 0 0 5110
colonial 0 0 0 3110 0 0
after independence 0 2110 0 0 0 0
Q.14 Explain the reasons and major causes of the change in any of the cases?
I
no authority 1_00 7_1_10 _
I don ' know 311 0----------------




Q. 16 If yes, please give your opinion on the following?
with Law enforcement by government 0 0
with creation of local committees (eo-management) 0 4110
go back to the older system ( traditional control) 0 6110
Q.17 According to your experience, what is the role of women in fishing?
have nothing to do with it 0 0
collecting fire wood 0 6110
fish processing 0 4/10
fish selling 0 0




Q.19 If yes, What is your level of education?
Grade: A=Primary school only; B=Secondary school ;
A B
Completed 0 0 0 0
Did not complete 0 1110 0 · 0
Thank you very much for your time and cooperation.
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APPENDIX 2 Questionnaire addressed to the fishermen.
Preamble:
I'm a student from the Centre for Environment and Development at UNP, South Africa, studying
about the situation of inland fisheries in this part of 'Niassa Province , northern Mozambique.
Concerning to your own experience and with particular reference to your own fishing areas, please
would you respond to the following questions? Comments are welcome, wherever appropriate.
Name of the village/fishing area:-------------------------------------------------------------------------
~ocation:---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date :--------/--------/1999
Number of Interviewees, n = 46; Responses are presented in figures according to respondents;
Q.l How old are you?
<10 years 0 0
11 - 15 0 0
16 - 20 0 3/46
21 - 25 0 6/46
26 - 30 0 9/46
31 - 35 0 13/46
>40 0 5/46
Q.2 According to your experience, what do you think has changed in relation to the over time?
declined 0 (please, give reasons) 20/46
increased 0 (please, give reasons) 9/46
remained the same 0 (please, give reasons) 15/46
Q.3 According to your experience, what do you think that has influenced change in relation to the
people? .
attitude 0 (please, specify) 23/46
culture 0 (please, specify) 16/46
religion 0 (please specify) 7/46
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Q.4 In your experience, where are the people involved in fishing from?
outside the area/Tanzania 0 26/46
outside the area/Mozambique 0 9/46
from the area/locally 0 11/46
Q.5 Do foreign fishermen have to report to the chief when they go fishing?
o
46/46












Q.9 Do you usually migrate from one area to another?
Q.10 Why do you migrate?
38/46
8/46
follow the fish season 0 38/46
-
look better sale price 0 0
other reasons 0 (Please, specify) 8/46
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Q.11 What type of fishing craft do you usually use, for different fishing areas?
in nvers on the lakes
bark of the tree D 0 D 24/46
dugout canoe D 12/46 D 0
Q.12 What type of fishing gear do you use, according to the following?
fishing traps D 18/46
gill nets D 11/46
plant parts (poisons) D 9/46
hook and line D 7/46
others D (Please, specify) 0
Q.13 Does fishing activity include collect ing plant parts for poisoning?
(if yes, go to Q.13) 46/46
o
Q.14 For how long have you collecting plant parts for fish poisoning?
1 - 3 years D 0
-
3 - 7 years D 7/46
7 - 10 years D 11/46
>10 years D 28/46
Q.15 Do you collect plant parts for fish poisoning as?
Exclusive activity D 0
supplementary activity D 46/46
Q.16 What are the reasons that makes you engage in the fish poisoning methods? (Please specify).
catch more fish (effective) D 26/46
do not have to spend money D 8/46
many outsiders using it 0 12/46
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Q.17 How often do you mostly use plant parts for fish poisoning, according to the following?
Grade : A=more frequently B=frequently C=Very unusual
A B C
dry season 0 46/46 0 0 0 0
wet season 0 0 0 0 0 46/46
rrvers 0 0 0 0 0 0
lakes 0 0 0 46/46 0 0
Q.18 What arrangements do you have to make in order to get these plant parts for poisoning?
no arrangements 0 0
personally, collect from the forest 0 46/46
contract somebody from outside the area 0 0
Q.19 What are the main sources of plant parts for poisoning?
Outside the area 0 0
locally from the area (mountains and forests) 0 46/46
Q.20 What are other forms offish poisoning do you experience in the fishing areas and their sources?
locally outside the area abroad
chemicals 0 0 0 0 0 31/46
acid from car battery 0 0 0 . 15/46 0 0
5/46
Q.21 How many days do you spend in a fishing trip?
I
<010 1~1_1_--15-------11->0-1-5-'-------
. 18/46 0 23/46 .
Q.22 What is your average catch per month?
Quantity of fish (kg) : Grade : A=<50 kg B=51 - 100 C=101 - 150 D=>150
I~ I: I: I:7/46 11146 23/46 5/46
Q.23 Where do you get more money in relation to location of fish sell?
Grade: A=fish sell at market (Tanzania); B=fish sell at the village; C=fish sell at fishing area;
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A B C
smoked/dried fish 0 46/46 0 0 0 0
fresh fish 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q.24 What problems do experience in fishing?
competition with other fishermen 0 31/46
access without permission 0 0
attitude of users from outside 0 15/46
Q.25 Are there ways in which the current situation could be improved?
Law enforcement by government 0 0
creation of local committees (eo-management) 0 33/46
go back to older system (traditional control) 0 13/46




Q.27 If yes, What your level of education?
Grade: A=Primary school only; B=Secondary school;
A B
Completed 0 0 0 0
Did not complete 0 19/46 0 0
Thank you very much for your time and cooperation.
121
APPENDIX 3 Questionnaire addressed to the fish processors
Preamble:
I 'm a student from the Centre for Environment and Development at UNP, South Africa, studying about
the situation of inland fisheries in this part ofNiassa Province, northern Mozambique. Concerning
to your own"experience and with particular reference to your own fishing areas, please would you
respond to the following questions? Comments are welcome, wherever appropriate.
Name of the village/fishing area: ------------------------------------------------------------------------
l-ocation:----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date:--------/--------/1999
Number ofInterviewees, n = 4; Responses are presented in figures according to respondents;
Q.1 How old are you?
<10 years 0 0
11 - 15 0 0
16 - 20 0 0
21 - 25 0 1/4
26 - 30 0 2/4
31 - 35 0 1/4
>40 0 0
Q.2 How long have you been working in fish processing?
<5years 0 1/4
5 - 10 years 0 3/4
>10 years 0 0




Q.4 Where do you process fish?
122
at the fishing area 0 4/4
at home 0 0
at the market 0 0








Q.7 How do you process the fish?
smoking 0 4/4
sun drying 0 0
salt drying 0 0
others 0 (please, specify) 0
Q.8 How is fish cured?
Ismoking
Q.9 How do yo dry the fish?
IOn the racks








< 1 day 0 0
1 day 0 1/4
1 -2 days 0 3/4
Q.11 Does the season affect processing methods? Please, mention which season?
I_wet/fain season .1~ 4/4
Q.12 What are the major problems you experience with storing fish?
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insect attack 0 3/4
fragmentation 0 1/4
pinking 0 0
no problems 0 0
others 0 0
Q.13 What has to be done to solve these situations?
take fish to the market soon 0 1/4
cure fish until taken to the market 0 3/4
Q.14 Who normally buys the processed fish?
Local fish traders 0 0
foreign fish traders 0 3/4
local people for home consumption 0 0
sale myself 0 1/4
Q.15 What are other roles do you play in fishing activity, rather than fish processing?
collecting/transporting fire wood 0 2/4
selling fish 0 1/4
others 0 (please, specify) 1/4




Q.17 If yes, What your level of education?




Completed 0 1/4 0 0
Did not complete 0 3/4 0 0
Thank you very much for your time and cooperation.
